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INTRODUCTION

In the last five years, the volume of False Claims Act' (FCA)
litigation has skyrocketed with over $20 billion in settlements
and judgments. 2 The FCA imposes civil liability on government
contractors who defraud government programs. Most FCA
recoveries are realized with the assistance of whistleblowers
("relators"), who act as so-called private attorneys general by
filing qui tam suits on behalf of the United States and bringing
key information to the attention of the DOJ. 3 Relators are
rewarded handsomely for their efforts. As the real party in
interest, the government must decide whether to intervene and
take control of the litigation. If the government declines to
intervene, the FCA's unique public-private enforcement
mechanism permits the relator to continue the litigation on the
government's behalf.
The heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) applies to FCA claims: "In alleging fraud . . . a
party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud."4 Since the FCA was resurrected as an
enhanced antifraud tool in 1986, 5 courts have disagreed about
what this pleading standard requires from relators who continue
their suits without DOJ intervention. A strict interpretation of
Rule 9(b)-requiring a relator's complaint to identify
t
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1 31 USC § 3729 et seq.
2
See US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Fraud Statistics - Overview *1-2
(Nov 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/49MA-8VL8.
3
See id. The phrase "qui tam" is derived from the Latin qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur, or "who pursues this action on our Lord the King's
behalf as well as his own." See Rockwell InternationalCorp v United States, 549 US 457,
463 n 2 (2007). Such suits date back to thirteenth-century England. See generally, for
example, Prior of Lewes v De Holt (Ex 1300), reprinted in 48 Selden Socy 198 (1931).
4
FRCP9(b).
5 See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-562, 100 Stat 3153.
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representative samples of the allegedly false claims-is falling
out of fashion across the circuits. Most courts instead opt for a
relaxed standard, refusing to dismiss claims that provide
particularized details of a fraudulent scheme along with reliable
indicia that false claims were actually submitted. Over the last
six years, the Supreme Court has refused three times to resolve
this question, and the Rule 9(b) pleading standard continues to
be applied inconsistently across the circuits.6 This Comment
presents and explores new arguments in favor of the strict
pleading standard.
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I presents the FCA's
general substantive and procedural framework, as well as Rule
9(b)'s application to FCA litigation. Part II surveys how courts
have steadily abandoned the once-popular strict standard, which
requires relator complaints to identify the details of specific false
claims. Finally, Part III investigates the merits of the strict
standard on the basis of the FCA in practice, drawing from recent
empirical research on the FCA, theoretical literature on pleading
practice, and new data obtained through a 2015 Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request. This Comment finds that the
strict standard best aligns the DOJ's and the relator's incentives,
and that it provides the strongest support for systemic efficiency.
The new FOIA data are essential to this analysis, as they show
that the relaxed standard has had no practical effect on fraud
enforcement or recovery. Part III then presents an economic
model to demonstrate that the strict standard does not diminish
relators' incentives to file high-quality qui tam suits, but rather
serves as a much-needed screening mechanism to ensure that the
DOJ is not flooded with low-quality tips. This Comment concludes
that, counterintuitively, a strict pleading standard deters and
punishes fraud more effectively than a relaxed standard.

I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RULE 9(B)
Compared to some of the more creative private enforcement
schemes of the past,7 the FCA's qui tam mechanism appears to be

6
See generally United States v Health Management Associates, Inc, 591 Fed Appx
693 (11th Cir 2014), cert denied, 135 S Ct 2379 (2015); United States v Takeda
PharmaceuticalsNorth America, Inc, 707 F3d 451 (4th Cir 2013), cert denied, 134 S Ct
1759 (2014); United States v Ortho Biotech Products,LP, 579 F3d 13 (1st Cir 2009), cert
denied, 130 S Ct 3454 (2010).
7
See, for example, An Acte for the Punishment of Vagabondes and for the Relief of
the Poore and Impotent Parsons, 1 Edw 6 c 3 (1547) (rewarding whistleblowers who aided
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a mild and balanced antifraud tool. However, the FCA's publicprivate enforcement structure has emerged as an existential
threat to government contractors, primarily to those in the
health-care and defense sectors. 8 Advocates extol the private
enforcement mechanism's ability to ferret out contractor fraud.9
Critics object to the menace of opportunistic whistleblowers,
draconian penalties, and ever-expanding substantive theories of
liability. 10 This Part introduces the substance and procedure of
the FCA and its interaction with Rule 9(b).
A. The False Claims Act
The FCA was originally passed in 1863 to address increasing
incidents of defense-contractor fraud during the Civil War.11 It
included a qui tam provision allowing private parties to bring suit
on behalf of the government. 12 Today's FCA provides for civil
penalties of $5,500 to $11,000 plus treble damages for each FCA
violation.13 While the FCA covers seven distinct substantive
violations, most suits are premised on violations of two statutory
provisions: "knowingly present[ing], or caus[ing] to be presented,
a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval"14--a direct
false claim-or "knowingly mak[ing], us[ing], or caus[ing] to be
made or used, a false record or statement material to an
in the conviction of loiterers and vagabonds with a bounty as well as with possession of
the defendant himself, who was to serve as a personal slave for two years, forced to any
"suche wo'ke and Labo' how vyle so ever it be"). King Edward VI admitted in his private
journal that this statute was an "extream meesure." C.G. Merewether, A Sweep among the
Cobwebs;or, Curiositiesof the Law in Times Past, in Leicester Literary and Philosophical
Society, Report of the Council Presented to the Annual General Meeting, Assembled, June
1855: And a Selection of Papers Read before the Society since Its Formation 193, 213
(Leicester 1855).
8
See Claire M. Sylvia, The False Claims Act: Fraud against the Government
§§ 2:14-15 at 65-69 (West 2010).
9 See, for example, False Claims Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution and Civil Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong, 2d
Sess 4-6 (2014) ("2014 False Claims Act Hearing') (statement of Representative John
Conyers Jr).
10 See, for example, id at 82-84 (statement of David W. Ogden, Counsel for US
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform).
11 See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United
States, 12 Stat 696, 698 (1863).
12 See Cong Globe, 37th Cong, 3d Sess 913, 955-56 (Feb 14, 1863) (Senator Howard)
("The bill offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his
coconspirator . . .'setting a rogue to catch a rogue."').
13 31 USC § 3729(a). The 1986 amendments originally provided for penalties of
$5,000 to $10,000, but FCA penalties have increased due to inflation. 28 CFR § 85.3(a)(9).
14 31 USC § 3729(a)(1)(A).
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obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government"5-a reverse false claim. However, the FCA reaches
far beyond cases of mere "presentment" and garden-variety fraud:
"Congress wrote expansively, meaning to reach all types of fraud,
without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
Government."16
Until 1986, the FCA had remained largely unchanged since
its enactment in the nineteenth century. In response to reports of
widespread fraud,17 Congress amended the FCA in 1986 to
strengthen the role of whistleblowers.'s Specifically, the
amendments increased rewards to qui tam relators, permitted
relators to continue FCA suits without government intervention,
provided for protection against employer retaliation, established
a fee-shifting mechanism to reward successful relators with
expenses and attorney's fees, and removed the "information in the
possession of the Government" jurisdictional bar. 19 The
amendments also increased the statutory penalties (from $2,000
to a range of $5,000 to $10,000), and they replaced double
damages with treble damages.20 Since 1986 the government has
recovered over $30 billion through qui tam litigation, and relators
have pocketed over $4.7 billion in statutory bounties.21 Fiscal year
2014 proved to be a record year for FCA litigation, with
recoveries22 totaling $5.69 billion--over half of which was
collected from qui tam suits.23 The explosive and continuing
growth in qui tam litigation since 1986 may be largely
attributable to the enhanced role of whistleblowers, and
particularly to the increased bounties promised to relators: 15 to
15 31 USC § 3729(a)(1)(G). For the other five statutory violations, see 31 USC

§ 3729(a)(1)(B)-(F).
16
Cook County, Illinois v United States, 538 US 119, 129 (2003) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
17 See, for example, General Accounting Office, 2 Fraudin Government Programs:How Extensive Is It?-How Can It Be Controlled?A Report to Congress 7-10 (1981); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Controlling Fraud against the Government: The Need for Decentralized
Enforcement, 58 Notre Dame L Rev 995, 995-96 (1983).
18 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, HR 4827, 99th Cong, 2d Sess, in 132 Cong
Rec H 22330, 22335 (daily ed Sept 9, 1986).
19 See The False Claims Reform Act of 1985, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess
17-35 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266, 5282-5300.
20
31 USC § 3729(a).
21 DOJ, Fraud Statistics at *1-2 (cited in note 2).
22 As used in this Comment, "recoveries" refers to both settlements and judgments.
23
See US Department of Justice, Civil Division, Justice DepartmentRecovers Nearly
$6 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Office of Public Affairs, Nov
20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YJ6G-25VQ.
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25 percent of any successful recovery if the government
intervenes in the FCA suit, or 25 to 30 percent if the government
declines to intervene.24
A unique procedural framework governs the FCA's qui tam
provisions. The relator files the suit under seal and delivers a copy
to the DOJ together with a written disclosure detailing the
relator's evidence and information.25 During the seal period, the
DOJ investigates the relator's claims for the purpose of deciding
whether to intervene in the suit. Courts routinely grant the DOJ
broad extensions of the statutory sixty-day seal period.26 Indeed,
the average DOJ investigation under seal lasts nearly six
hundred days.27
Another unique feature of the FCA is the relator's ability to
continue the suit in the event that the government declines to
intervene.28 The DOJ does not intervene in most cases. Recent
empirical literature on the FCA notes that the intervention rate
dropped from over 40 percent in the early 1990s to approximately
25 percent by 2011, and suggests that the average intervention
rate is 27.9 percent. 29 A new data set provided by the DOJ in
response to a 2015 FOIA request sheds light on this continuing
trend.30 The intervention rate has fallen to new lows: the average
intervention rate in the ten-year period between 2005 and 2014

31 USC § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
26 See Sylvia, False Claims Act § 11:17 at 711 & n 7 (cited in note 8).
27 David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement
Attract Excessive Litigation?,42 Pub Cont L J 225, 246 (2013).
28 See 31 USC § 3730(c)(3).
29 See David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:
EmpiricalAnalysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation under the False Claims Act,
107 Nw U L Rev 1689, 1718-19 (2013); David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private
Attorney General:Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 Colum L Rev 1244, 1289 (2012).
See also Kwok, 42 Pub Cont L J at 239 (cited in note 27) (providing empirical support for
an intervention rate of 27 percent).
30 The FOIA data set was provided by the DOJ in February 2015. It includes
comprehensive case information from 6,461 qui tam cases-that is, nearly every unsealed
qui tam case filed since 1986. The FOIA data set was then loaded into a relational database
and SQL queries were used to generate the figures provided in this Comment. It must be
noted, however, that nearly 3,500 cases remain under seal and are not part of the data set.
Nearly all of these sealed cases were filed in the past few years and remain under
investigation. For this reason, wherever possible, this Comment avoids calculating figures
based on date of filing and instead utilizes date of election or date of recovery, as these
dates guarantee a more representative sample. The FOIA data set and further information
regarding the data are available from the author on request.
24
25
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was 23.4 percent, and the average intervention rate in the five3
year period between 2010 and 2014 was 22.4 percent. 1
DOJ intervention serves as a strong forecast of whether a qui
tam suit will succeed. The FOIA data set shows that from 2005 to
2014, 89.5 percent of intervened cases resulted in a recovery but
only 6.8 percent of declined cases were similarly successful.32
While net recovery amounts in declined cases have experienced a
slight uptick, this increase is attributable to merely a handful of
high-value outlier settlements and does not change the fact that
the recovery rate of declined cases has been steadily falling since
the 1990s. 33 Not only do declined cases have a languid recovery
rate, but also the FOIA data set shows that the median dollarvalue recovery in winning declined cases is less than one-third
34
the median dollar-value recovery in winning intervened cases.
As a result, recoveries in declined cases have amounted to less
than 4 percent of the FCA's total recoveries since 1986.35
When the DOJ does intervene, it takes the lead in the suit,
and the government's complaint in intervention supersedes the
relator's complaint. 36 As the operative pleading, the complaint in
intervention is generally not entitled to the flexibility afforded to
relators under a relaxed pleading standard, because the
31 These figures represent the total number of intervened cases out of the total
number of cases, measured by the year in which the election decision was made. These
generated figures avoid the right-censoring distortion that would result from calculating
the intervention rate based on case filing year. The distortion would be right censored
because an election decision is made more quickly in declined cases than in intervened
cases, and thus an analysis based on case filing year would be overpopulated with declined
cases and underpopulated with intervened cases. For an example of related data subject
to this right-censoring problem, see David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement's
Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 114 Colum L Rev 1913, 1961-62 (2014).
32 These figures represent the average recovery rates for intervened and declined
cases from 2005 to 2014. The recovery-rate numerators are pegged to case recovery dates,
and the denominators are pegged to case recovery dates (for successful claims) or case "end
dates" (for unsuccessful claims). By avoiding measurements based on filing date or election
date, the generated figures ensure that the recent data are not distorted through right
censoring. Open cases that have not returned a recovery, cases under investigation, and
cases under seal are not included in these calculations. For similar calculations of recovery
rates based on 2009 and 2011 FOIA requests, see Kwok, 42 Pub Cont L J at 241 (cited in
note 27); Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1720-21 (cited in note 29).
33 See Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1721-22 (cited in note 29).
34 The FOIA data show that the median recovery for declined cases is 32.2 percent
the size of the median recovery for intervened cases from January 2002 to January 2015.
Median recoveries are a more accurate benchmark than mean recoveries, because mean
recoveries are heavily skewed by several high-value outlier recoveries.
35 See DOJ, Fraud Statistics at *1-2 (cited in note 2).
36 See John T. Boese, 1 Civil False Claims and Qui Tam Actions § 4.05 at 4-232
to -235 (Wolters KIuwer 4th ed 2011 & Supp 2015).
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government's involvement in the suit alleviates informationasymmetry concerns.3 7 Furthermore, the DOJ's complaint in
intervention is often the product of months or years of
investigations, interviews, subpoenas, and discussions with
defense counsel. Thus, in practice, the relaxed standard never has
the opportunity to apply to intervened suits, for two related
reasons. First, the strong success record of intervened suits is no
accident: the DOJ intervenes only when it has first gathered
evidence of the false claims underlying the allegations and is thus
able to survive a motion to dismiss under either a relaxed or strict
iteration of the pleading standard. Second, when the DOJ
intervenes, almost all defendants settle, and most do so rather
quickly. The FOIA data indicate that over 97 percent of all
successful intervened suits result in a settlement-not a
judgment-and that over half of such suits settle within ten days
of the intervention election, thereby obviating the need for the
application of Rule 9(b).38
B.

Rule 9(b)

Rule 9(b) states that "[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake."39 Despite some academic criticism leveled
against Rule 9(b) generally,40 as well as in the FCA context

37
See, for example, United States v Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc, 903 F Supp 2d 473,
486-87 (ED Tex 2011) (finding the Government's complaint noncompliant with Rule 9(b)
and not discussing potential information asymmetry); In re CardiacDevices Qui Tam
Litigation, 221 FRD 318, 336 (D Conn 2004) (finding the Government's complaint
sufficient because it provided the defendants with fair notice of the substance of the claims
against them). For a discussion of how the relaxed standard seeks to resolve concerns of
information asymmetry, see Part II.B.
38 As indicated above in note 30, the FOIA data set and further information
regarding the data are available from the author on request. See also James B. Helmer Jr,
False Claims Act: Whistleblower Litigation 1017, 1023-27, 1036-38 (Bloomberg BNA 6th
ed 2012) (describing defendants' incentives to settle quickly). This pattern of quick
settlements following intervention raises additional questions beyond the scope of this
Comment. For example, it suggests that in many cases the DOJ and the defendant began
negotiating settlement eventualities prior to intervention. Thus, it is not clear whether
intervention is actually driving settlement, or whether-perhaps to limit the relator's
bounty, perhaps to safeguard DOJ control over the final settlement, or perhaps to ensure
that the DOJ gets proper credit for the recovery-settlement is driving intervention.
39
FRCP 9(b).
40 See generally, for example, Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened
Pleading,86 Ind L J 119 (2011); Christopher M. Fairman, An Invitation to the Rulemakers
- Strike Rule 9(b), 38 UC Davis L Rev 281 (2004).
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specifically, 41 all courts agree that Rule 9(b) applies alongside

Rule 8(a)(2) plausibility pleading in an FCA suit.

42

This standard

generally requires an FCA plaintiff to allege the time and place of
the fraud, its content and consequences, and what the defendant
gained.43 In other words, the complaint must identify the "who,
44
what, when, where, and how" of the alleged fraud.
The roots of Rule 9(b) lie in ancient pleading practice. Fraud
was a disfavored action both at common law and in code pleading
jurisdictions, and was thus subjected to a heightened pleading
standard. 4s American courts have required particularized
pleading of fraud since the late eighteenth century. 46 The
commonly cited purposes of the particularity requirement are:
(1) protection of the defendant's reputation, 47 (2) deterrence of
frivolous and strike suits,4 s (3) prevention of fraud suits in which
the dispositive facts are learned through discovery, 49 (4) offering
the defendant particularized notice so that he can adequately

41 See, for example, Helmer, False Claims Act at 575-78 (cited in note 38) (arguing
that Rule 9(b) should not apply to FCA claims at all because "[a]n FCA case is not a fraud
case"). See also Charis Ann Mitchell, Comment, A Fraudulent Scheme's Particularity
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Liberty U L Rev 337, 365-66
(2010) (arguing that Rule 9(b) should not be applied to a qui tam complaint under the FCA,
because "fraud is not required for a violation of the FCA").
42 See Boese, 2 Civil False Claims § 5.04 at 5-64 & n 229, 5-81 (cited in note 36)
(noting that beyond particularity, "plausibility is required of FCA allegations, and facts
must be pled that make fraud not just conceivable, but plausible").
43 See Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 5A FederalPracticeand Procedure
§ 1297 at 74 (West 3d ed 2004). See also, for example, United States v Medco Health
Solutions, Inc, 671 F3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir 2012).
44 DiLeo v Ernst & Young, 901 F2d 624, 627 (7th Cir 1990).
45 See Jeff Sovern, ReconsideringFederal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized
Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 FRD 143, 144-46 (1985).
46 See, for example, Wharton's Executors v Lowrey, 2 US (2 Dall) 364, 365 (CC D Pa
1796) ("[T]he fraud being denied on oath, and unsupported by any species of evidence, the
complainant ought not to be permitted to harass the defendant."); United States v Watkins,
28 F Cas 419, 428 (Cir Ct DC 1829) (requiring "positive and precise averments," which
"state what was pretended; and that what was pretended was false; and wherein and in
what particular it was false").
47 See, for example, Segal v Gordon, 467 F2d 602, 607 (2d Cir 1972) ("Rule 9(b)'s
specificity requirement stems.., from the desire to protect defendants from the harm that
comes to their reputations or to their goodwill when they are charged with serious
wrongdoing.").
48 See, for example, United States v LaboratoryCorp of America, Inc, 290 F3d 1301,
1316-17 (11th Cir 2002) (Barkett dissenting) (invoking Rule 9(b) as a bar to "spurious
charges or frivolous lawsuits").
49 See, for example, United States v Rogan, 2002 WL 31433390, *3 (ND Ill) (naming
the prevention of "fishing expeditions" as one of Rule 9(b)'s purposes).
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prepare his response pleading,50 and (5) judicial reluctance to
reopen completed transactions.51
Particularized pleading serves an essential function in the
FCA context. Rule 9(b) first becomes relevant when the suit is
unsealed-that is, after the DOJ makes its intervention
decision-and the defendant has his first opportunity to appraise
the allegations and file a motion to dismiss. Once unsealed and
publicized, FCA suits may cause a corporate defendant's stock
price to drop, or they may result in layoffs and lost business
opportunities.52 In multiyear DOJ investigations, civil
investigative demands and subpoenas may cause defendants to
incur millions of dollars in legal fees before the complaint is ever
unsealed. 53 Furthermore, the privatization of enforcement
through the use of relators has incentivized armies of
opportunistic plaintiffs to file suit, of which 16 percent are repeat
relators. 54 Meritless FCA suits impose significant financial
burdens on the taxpayer by wasting the DOJ's investigative
resources and increasing the costs of government programs and
55
contracts.
A further justification for particularized pleading in the FCA
context is the presumption that the government possesses the
documents needed to make its case. Classic misrepresentation
cases presumed that a defrauded party should be able to provide
the particulars of an allegedly fraudulent transaction because the
party had a direct role in that transaction.56 When an FCA
defendant contracts directly with a government agency, the
affected agency should be able to easily provide the DOJ with its
records of the transaction. However, this presumption becomes
problematic when the government claims, for example, that a
50

See, for example, Laboratory Corp, 290 F3d at 1310 ("The particularity rule serves

an important purpose in fraud actions by alerting defendants to the precise misconduct
with which they are charged.").
51 See, for example, Stearns v Page, 48 US 819, 828-29 (1849) (discussing how a court
will "exercise great caution in sustaining bills which seek to disturb" settled accounts, and
invoking the particularity requirement as a means to help the court ensure that it is "not
committing another, and perhaps greater, mistake" in reopening a completed transaction).
52 See Pamela H. Bucy, PrivateJustice, 76 S Cal L Rev 1,63 (2002).
53 For more information on investigations prior to unsealing, see Part III.B.
54 See Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1288-98 (cited in note 29); Christina Orsini
Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the PublicInterest: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 107
Colum L Rev 949, 975 (2007) (noting that "78% of qui tam suits were frivolous").
55 See Todd J. Canni, Who's Making False Claims, the Qui Tam Plaintiff or the
Government Contractor? A Proposal to Amend the FCA to Require That All Qui Tam
PlaintiffsPossess DirectKnowledge, 37 Pub Cont L J 1, 11-12 (2007).
56 See Fairman, 38 UC Davis L Rev at 288-89 (cited in note 40).
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pharmaceutical company's fraudulent off-label marketing or
upcoding57 caused third parties to submit false Medicare claims
for reimbursement.58 Here, in the absence of a straightforward
presentment claim, the government may understandably have a
more difficult time identifying the specific false claims. 59
Rule 9(b) is traditionally applied on a case-by-case basis that
depends on the context of the suit, the complexity of the
transaction, the parties' relationship, and the difficulty of
preparing adequate responsive pleadings based on the complexity
of the allegations.60 Yet courts are divided on the exact height of
the Rule 9(b) hurdle for claims that relators bring on their own
after the DOJ declines to intervene.

II.

DECLINED: THE PLEADING STANDARD APPLIED TO RELATORS

While it was once a topic of contention, all courts have

ultimately agreed that Rule 9(b) applies to

FCA suits.61

Since the

FCA was enacted, courts have placed particular emphasis on the
importance of Rule 9(b) in protecting qui tam defendants from
potentially meritless suits.62 At its most basic level, Rule 9(b)
demands dismissal of complaints that fail to establish the "time,
place, persons, and fraudulent nature of the alleged acts."63 Some
courts have termed these requirements as "journalistic,"64
demanding the identification of the "who, what, when, where, and

57 See United States v Community Health Systems, Inc, 501 F3d 493, 497 n 2 (6th Cir
2007) (defining "upcoding" as "the practice of billing Medicare for medical services or
equipment designated under a code that is more expensive than what a patient actually
needed or was provided").
58 See Boese, I Civil False Claims § 2.01[C] at 2-31 to -34 (cited in note 36).
59 See 31 USC § 3729(a)(1)(A) (providing for liability when an individual "knowingly
presents ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval"); Helmer, False Claims
Act at 158-60 (cited in note 38).
60 See, for example, United States v Kanneganti, 565 F3d 180, 188 (5th Cir 2009)
(emphasizing that "Rule 9(b)'s ultimate meaning is context-specific, and thus there is no
single construction of Rule 9(b) that applies in all contexts") (quotation marks and citation
omitted); Boese, 2 Civil False Claims § 5.04[B] at 5-84 to -84.1 (cited in note 36).
61 See United States v Bombardier Corp and Envirovac, Inc, 286 F3d 542, 551-52
(DC Cir 2002) ("Every circuit to consider the issue has held that, because the False Claims
Act is self-evidently an anti-fraud statute, complaints brought under it must comply with
Rule 9(b).").
62 See, for example, United States v Epic Healthcare Management Group, 193 F3d
304, 309 (5th Cir 1999) ("A special relaxing of Rule 9(b) is a qui tam plaintiffs ticket to the
discovery process that the statute itself does not contemplate.").
63 Boese, 2 Civil False Claims § 5.07[B] at 5-70 to -71 (cited in note 36).
64 United States v AssociatedAnesthesiologistsof Springfield, Ltd, 2014 WL 4198199,
"12 (CD Ill).
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how" of the fraud.65 Other courts have described Rule 9(b) as a
requirement that complaints must, "at a minimum, set forth the
time, place and specific content of each alleged act of fraud."66 The
most frequently stated judicially created interpretation is that a
sufficient fraud complaint requires "the time, place, and contents
of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person
making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby."67
This Part describes the general features and procedural
consequences of two interpretations of Rule 9(b) that form the
center of a circuit split. When the DOJ declines intervention and
the relator chooses to bring the suit alone, some courts have
fashioned a strict standard that requires the relator's complaint
to identify representative samples of the allegedly false claims
with a high degree of detail.68 In contrast, other courts have
applied a relaxed standard that treats representative samples as
merely one way to meet the particularity requirement. Insider
relators may also meet Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard
by "alleging particular details of a scheme to submit false claims
paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that
claims were actually submitted."69
As might be expected with any context-based pleading
standard, these vaguely defined standards have delivered wildly
inconsistent results.7° As an additional complication, the FCA's
various substantive violations implicate varying types of proof
and different degrees of information asymmetry; thus, the
respective pleading standards are further nuanced depending on
the underlying substantive violation. The intercircuit survey in
this Part reveals that the circuit split is eroding in favor of the
relaxed standard.

DiLeo v Ernst & Young, 901 F2d 624, 627 (7th Cir 1990).
United States v CaliforniaMedical Review, Inc, 723 F Supp 1363, 1372 (ND
Cal 1989).
67 United States v Takeda PharmaceuticalsNorth America, Inc, 707 F3d 451, 45556 (4th Cir 2013).
68 See, for example, United States v St Luke's Hospital, Inc, 441 F3d 552, 557 (8th
65
66

Cir 2006).
69 United States v Kanneganti, 565 F3d 180, 190 (5th Cir 2009) (emphasis added).
70 For a comparative overview of the inconsistent application of plausibility pleading,
see Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Pleading,43 Urban Law 559, 564-77
(2011) ("[T]he lower courts' treatment of Iqbal is hardly a model of consistency.").
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A. The Strict Approach: Representative Samples Required
The strict pleading standard is best understood as a
stringent, bright-line adherence to the time, place, and manner
requirements of fraud allegations. Under the strict standard, a
complaint that merely describes a fraudulent scheme or alleges
fraud on information and belief does not survive a particularity
challenge. Rather, the strict pleading standard requires that
complaints allege particularized details of specific false claimsor representative samples thereof-that were allegedly submitted
to the government for payment. Courts began experimenting with
this bright-line requirement in the late 1990s. 71 It has been
employed over the past decade by the Second, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.72 Currently, only the
Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits continue to apply some
consistent version of a strict pleading standard.73 The
justifications for this approach are broad and primarily premised
74
on best serving Rule 9(b)'s objectives.
First, courts have noted that the strict standard is the only
means to provide adequate notice to defendants of the exact
allegations leveled against them.75 A large corporate FCA
defendant, for example, may regularly file hundreds of thousands
of claims with the government. Without knowing exactly which
claims are allegedly false, the defendant cannot prepare a
71 See, for example, United States v Allina Health System Corp, 1997 US Dist LEXIS
21402, *33-34 (D Minn) ("Plaintiffs must provide some representative examples of the
fraud which detail the specifics of who, where and when.").
72 See, for example, United States v Community Health Systems, Inc, 501 F3d 493,
510-11 (6th Cir 2007) ("In order for a relator to proceed to discovery on a fraudulent
scheme, the claims that are pled with specificity must be characteristic example[s].")
(quotation marks omitted); St Luke's Hospital,441 F3d at 557 ("[The relator] must provide
some representative examples of [the defendants'] alleged fraudulent conduct, specifying
the time, place, and content of their acts and the identity of the actors."); United States v
Laboratory Corp of America, Inc, 290 F3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir 2002) (finding a "fatal flaw"
in the complaint's failure to allege "specific claims" or "specific information about the
actual submission of claims").
73 See, for example, United States v Americare, Inc, 2013 WL 1346022, *3 (EDNY)
(collecting cases); Takeda Pharmaceuticals,707 F3d at 455-56; United States v Medco
Health Solutions, Inc, 671 F3d 1217, 1225 (11th Cir 2012) ("[A] relator must identify the
particular document and statement alleged to be false, who made or used it, when the
statement was made, how the statement was false, and what the defendants obtained as
a result.").
74 See, for example, Takeda Pharmaceuticals,707 F3d at 456; Community Health
Systems, 501 F3d at 510.
75 See, for example, United States v Pfizer, Inc, 507 F3d 720, 733 (1st Cir 2007)
(noting that although the relator "raise[d] facts that suggest[ed] fraud was possible," there
was not enough specificity "to give notice to Pfizer of the false claims").
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meaningful responsive pleading and is placed on uneven footing
going into discovery.76 Furthermore, detailed pleading is
necessary in order for the defendant to accurately assess whether
77
the complaint can be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
Second, a lurking danger exists that is unique to FCA suits.
Beyond the burden of high litigation costs, FCA defendants are
also exposed to the threat of a corporate death sentence. Under
the Federal Acquisition Regulation, 7s agency officials have broad
discretion to temporarily debar or permanently suspend a
government contractor after a finding of FCA liability.79 Many
FCA defendants in the defense and health-care sectors almost
certainly could not exist without the government as a contractual
partner. Due to this monopsonistic relationship, even a
temporary debarment can irreparably cripple a government
contractor. In fact, most FCA settlements include Corporate
Integrity Agreements to prevent the defendant's exclusion from
federal health-care, defense, or other acquisition programs.80 This
"settle or die" dynamic seems to have played a key role in the
FCA's success. The threat of debarment accounts for an "in
terrorem increment of the settlement value," a factor which also
played a central role in the establishment of plausibility pleading
in Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly.81 To this extent, a strict
interpretation of Rule 9(b) protects FCA defendants from baseless
allegations, which, if left unchecked, could threaten a defendant's
very existence.
Third, courts have noted that the FCA was not designed to
punish every type of fraud; "liability under the Act attaches only
to a claim actually presented to the government for payment, not

See Part III.B. 1.
See Boese, 2 Civil False Claims § 5.04[B] at 5-80.1 to -81 (cited in note 36).
48 CFR § 1 et seq.
79 See 48 CFR § 9406-2(a)-(b). See also Kate M. Manuel, Debarment and Suspension
of Government Contractors: An Overview of the Law Including Recently Enacted and
Proposed Amendments *4-7 (Congressional Research Service, Jan 6, 2012), archived at
http://perma.ccY97W-2FYB. See also Helmer, False Claims Act at 1016 & n 1 (cited in
note 38).
80 See Statements of David Ogden, former Deputy Attorney General 2009-10 at the
US Chamber of Commerce Legal Summit (C-SPAN, Oct 24, 2012), online at http://www.c
-span.org/video/?309024-4/federal-regulations (visited July 19, 2015) (Perma archive
unavailable) (detailing how this risk completely distorts the litigation process). See also,
for example, Sarah Westwood, HHS Still Doing Business with Firm That Twice Defrauded
Medicare (Washington Examiner, Nov 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q39U-DY7H.
81
550 US 544, 558 (2007) (quotation marks omitted).
76

77
78
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to the underlying fraudulent scheme."82 In this respect, courts
have referred to a false claim as the sine qua non of an FCA
violation.83 Accordingly, particularized allegations of an FCA
violation must include the details of at least one of the claims
underlying the defendant's potential liability.
A recent case from the Seventh Circuit displays the strict
standard in action. In United States v Ukrainian Village
Pharmacy, Inc,84 the United States declined to intervene in the
qui tam suit of Yury Grenadyor, a disgruntled pharmacist in
Chicago.s5 His relator complaint alleged that his employer, a
pharmacy network, had been continuously violating the FCA by
providing kickbacks to loyal customers in the form of Russianlanguage TV guides and tins of roe and sprats, as well as by
categorically waiving co-pays in violation of Medicare and
Medicaid competition guidelines. 88 Unfortunately for Grenadyor,
his complaint failed to allege any particularized details of claims
that had allegedly been submitted for payment. 87 The court
dismissed Grenadyor's claims under the strict pleading standard
even though the eventual submission of a false claim was the
logical conclusion of the fraudulent scheme as alleged. The court
noted that "[tlo comply with Rule 9(b) Grenadyor would have had
to allege either that the pharmacy submitted a claim to Medicare
(or Medicaid) on behalf of a specific patient who had received a
kickback, or at least name a Medicare patient who had received a
kickback." 88 Without explanation and without announcing a clear
rule, Judge Richard Posner ignored Seventh Circuit precedent
applying the relaxed standard89 and instead cited to sister-circuit
precedent employing the strict standard. 90

82
Takeda Pharmaceuticals,707 F3d at 456. See also United States v McNinch, 356
US 595, 599 (1958) ("The False Claims Act was not designed to reach every kind of fraud
practiced on the Government.").
83
See, for example, LaboratoryCorp, 290 F3d at 1311.
84 772 F3d 1102 (7th Cir 2014).
85 Id at 1104.
86 Id at 1104-07.
See id at 1107.
87
88
Ukrainian Village Pharmacy, 772 F3d at 1107.
89
See United States v Rolls-Royce Corp, 570 F3d 849, 854 (7th Cir 2009) (Ve don't
think it essential for a relator to produce the invoices (and accompanying representations)
at the outset of the suit.").
90 Ukrainian Village Pharmacy,772 F3d at 1107, citing Community Health Systems,
501 F3d at 504, and LaboratoryCorp, 290 F3d at 1311-12.
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The Relaxed Approach: Representative Samples Not
Required

The relaxed approach, first explored in the late 2000s,
maintains that the "use of representative examples is simply one
means of meeting the pleading obligation."91 In other words, a
complaint is sufficient under Rule 9(b) if it alleges "particular
details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable
indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually
submitted."92 This nuanced standard appears to require a high
degree of particularity regarding the scheme, coupled with a lower
degree of particularity regarding the actual submission of false
claims. The "indicia of reliability" factor originally evolved from
93
the Eleventh Circuit's description of Rule 9(b)'s requirements
and has since transformed into a device that effectively lowers the
pleading standard for relators with insider knowledge of the
defendant's allegedly fraudulent practices. The First, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits were the first appellate courts to apply the relaxed
94
approach in the late 2000s.
These circuits-along with others that have recently adopted
the relaxed approach-have offered several broad justifications
for the relaxed standard that comport well with the "liberal ethos"
of modern pleading practice. 95 First, courts have noted that unlike
the government, many relators simply have no way to access the
key particularized information that is needed to provide detailed
allegations of specific false claims. Accordingly, the strict
standard is too harsh on relators because this information tends

91 Ebeid v Lungwitz, 616 F3d 993, 998 (9th Cir 2010).
92 Id at 998-99.
93 Laboratory Corp, 290 F3d at 1311 ("[I]f Rule 9(b) is tobe adhered to, some indicia
of reliability must be given in the complaint to support the allegation of an actual false
claim for payment being made to the Government.").
94 See, for example, United States v Ortho Biotech Products, LP, 579 F3d 13, 30 (1st
Cir 2009) (refusing to dismiss a complaint that identified the participants of a scheme as
well as where, when, and how the scheme occurred); Kanneganti, 565 F3d at 190
(emphasizing that Rule 9(b) is necessarily "context specific and flexible"); Ebeid, 616 F3d
at 998-99 (adopting the relaxed standard). The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia likewise employs the relaxed standard. See, for example, United
States v CDW Technology Services, Inc, 722 F Supp 2d 20, 26 (DDC 2010) ("[A] plaintiff
need not allege the existence of a request for payment with particularity.") (quotation
marks omitted).
95 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 Colum L Rev 433, 439 (1986).
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to be exclusively in the defendants' hands.96 Second, courts have
sought to craft a pleading standard that supports what they
believe to be Rule 9(b)'s primary goal: notice. 97 These courts find
that the relaxed approach can fulfill Rule 9(b)'s objective of
providing defendants with adequate notice, while still allowing
relators to proceed to discovery despite a failure to identify the
specific claims that may ultimately prove the fraud.98 Third,
courts have reasoned that the relaxed pleading standard best
comports with the goals underlying the FCA, and that an overly
strict application of Rule 9(b) "undermines the FCA's
effectiveness as a tool to combat fraud against the United
States. 99 Fourth, courts have noted that requiring complaints to
detail the time, place, and content of any alleged fraudulent
representations parallels the elements of common-law fraud, and
that these requirements may not be inflexibly superimposed on
FCA claims.100 Finally, courts have considered it unreasonable to
require allegations of representative examples of false claims, on
the grounds that such a requirement would be tantamount to
asking the relator to offer the same proof at the pleading stage
that he would need to prevail at trial.1o1
A leading case from the Fifth Circuit shows how the relaxed
standard functions in practice. The United States declined to
intervene in the qui tam suit of Dr. James H. Grubbs, a

96

See, for example, Rolls-Royce, 570 F3d at 854 ("Since a relator is unlikely to have

[certain] documents unless he works in the defendant's accounting department, the
[requirement of representative examples] takes a big bite out of qui tam litigation.").
97 See United States v American Healthcorp,Inc, 977 F Supp 1329, 1333 (MD Tenn
1997) (applying the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements while "[k]eeping in mind that the
primary purpose of the pleading standard is to ensure Defendants receive notice of the
charges against them").
98 See, for example, Fogliav Renal Ventures Management, LLC, 754 F3d 153, 15657 (3d Cir 2014); Kanneganti, 565 F3d at 190.
99 Foglia, 754 F3d at 156, quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
United States v Takeda PharmaceuticalsNorth America, Inc, Docket No 12-1349, *10 (US
filed Feb 25, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 709660) ("Takeda Brief'). See also
Kanneganti, 565 F3d at 190 (suggesting that the strict standard adopted by opposing
circuits may be "stymieing legitimate efforts to expose fraud").
100 See, for example, Kanneganti, 565 F3d at 188-89 ("[A] claim under the False
Claims Act and a claim under common law or securities fraud are not on the same plane
in meeting the requirement of 'stat[ing] with particularity' the contents of the fraudulent
misrepresentation.").
101 See, for example, id at 189-90 ('To require these details at pleading is one small
step shy of requiring production of actual documentation with the complaint, a level of
proof not demanded to win at trial and significantly more than any federal pleading rule
contemplates.").
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psychiatrist employed at a hospital in Beaumont, Texas.lo 2 Dr.
Grubbs's relator complaint alleged that shortly after he was
hired, his employers divulged a fraudulent billing scheme to him
and solicited his participation by asking him to record patient
visits that had not occurred.103 Over the course of a year, Dr.
Grubbs witnessed the fraudulent scheme proceed. Yet, applying
the strict standard, the district court dismissed his second
amended complaint because it failed to allege sufficiently
particularized details of the false claims submitted to Medicaid
for reimbursement, such as the precise dollar amounts, billing
numbers, and other specific contents of the bills.104
The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the "time, place,
contents, and identity standard is not a straitjacket for Rule
9(b)."105

In regard to Grubbs's § 3729(a)(1)(A) presentment claim,

the court noted that in contrast to common-law fraud and
securities fraud, the FCA contains no reliance requirement and
exposes even unsuccessful false claims to liability.106 Thus,
because a jury could find that an FCA violation had occurred
without ever knowing the actual amount that the government
had been overcharged, a relator does not need to plead such
particulars in his complaint.107 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held
that "a relator's complaint, if it cannot allege the details of an
actually submitted false claim, may nevertheless survive by
alleging particular details of a scheme to submit false claims
paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that
claims were actually submitted."'10
C.

The Erosion of the Circuit Split

Over the course of the past ten years, the circuit split has
eroded in favor of the relaxed standard. Furthermore, the courts
that have adhered to the strict standard have applied it
inconsistently.109 For example, the Eighth Circuit recently
abandoned its adherence to the strict standard by noting that
relators who can "plead[ ] details about the defendant's billing
102

Id at 183-85.

103

Id.

104

Kanneganti, 565 F3d at 185, 190.

105 Id at 190 (quotation marks omitted).

Id at 189.
See id at 188-90.
108 Kanneganti, 565 F3d at 190.
109 For an overview of this inconsistent application, see Takeda Brief at *11-14 (cited
in note 99).
106
107
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practices and plead[ ] personal knowledge of the defendant's
submission of false claims" may be excused from the strict
standard. 110 Likewise while the Sixth Circuit has not yet departed
from the strict standard,"' it has indicated that the pleading
standard may be relaxed "when the relator has personal
knowledge that the claims were submitted by Defendants... for
payment." 112 The pleading standard as applied by the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits can thus be understood as a means of
distinguishing between
insider and outsider relators.
Approximately 25 percent of relators are outsiders such as
competitors, partners, subcontractors, or outside investigators.
Courts may not perceive such outsider relators as those for whom
the qui tam provisions were originally enacted. 11 The Third and
Tenth Circuits have also abandoned the strict standard.114
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit, once a bastion of the strict
standard,115 recently tempered its pleading rule, noting that
"alternative means are also available to satisfy [Rule 9(b)]."116 The
pleading standard remains an open question in the Seventh
Circuit, and despite Seventh Circuit precedent suggesting

110 United States v Planned Parenthoodof the Heartland,765 F3d 914, 918 (8th Cir
2014) (adopting the relaxed standard for relators with firsthand, personal knowledge of
the defendant's billing and claims systems).
111 See, for example, Community Health Systems, 501 F3d at 510 (holding that a
complaint that merely pleads a false scheme with particularity does not comply with Rule
9(b)'s requirements).
112 Chesbrough v VPA, PC, 655 F3d 461,471 (6th Cir 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
113 For an in-depth analysis of the most common relationships between relators and
defendants, see Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1288-98 (cited in note 29).
114 See Foglia, 754 F3d at 156-57. Compare United States v Regence BlueCross
BlueShield of Utah, 472 F3d 702, 727 (10th Cir 2006) ("(The complaint must be] linked to
allegations, stated with particularity, of the actual false claims submitted to the
government.") (quotation marks omitted), with United States v Envirocare of Utah, Inc,
614 F3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir 2010) ("[The complaint] need only show the specifics of a
fraudulent scheme and provide an adequate basis for a reasonable inference that false
claims were submitted as part of that scheme.").
115 See, for example, Hopper v Solvay Pharmaceuticals,Inc, 588 F3d 1318, 1326 (11th
Cir 2009). See also Medco Health Solutions, 671 F3d at 1225 ("[A] relator must identify
the particular document and statement alleged to be false, who made or used it, when the
statement was made, how the statement was false, and what the defendants obtained as
a result.").
116 United States v Health Management Associates, Inc, 2014 WL 5471925, *8-10
(11th Cir) (noting that "a relator with direct, first-hand knowledge of the defendants'
submission of false claims gained through her employment with the defendants may have
a sufficient basis for asserting that the defendants actually submitted false claims").
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adherence to the relaxed standard, 117 "[d]istrict courts in the
Seventh Circuit have applied both competing interpretations."118
Some circuits have carved out their own middle grounds. The
Fourth Circuit recently held that if the "defendant's actions, as
alleged and as reasonably inferred from the allegations, could
have led, but need not necessarily have led, to the submission of
false claims, a relator must allege with particularity that specific
false claims actually were presented to the government for
payment." 119 In other words, unless the relator can plead
particularized firsthand knowledge of an "integrated scheme in
which presentment of a claim for payment was a necessary
result," a complaint lacking specific examples of allegedly false
claims will fail to meet the Rule 9(b) threshold.120
The First Circuit's nuanced relaxed standard also bears
mentioning. This pleading standard distinguishes between
allegations that a defendant filed false claims and allegations
that a defendant induced thirdpartiesto file false claims.121 With
regard to the latter, a relator may satisfy Rule 9(b) by providing
factual or statistical evidence but need not necessarily provide
particularized details concerning each false claim.122

While not exhaustive, this Part has provided a bird's-eye view
courts treat relator complaints that fail to allege either the
how
of
detailed particulars of specific false claims or representative
samples of the alleged fraud.123 The trend is clear: courts are
moving away from the inflexibility of the strict standard and are
expanding the ways by which a relator's complaint may
sufficiently state a claim. However, the nuanced standards
announced by the circuits present a number of questions: What
concrete effect has the relaxed pleading standard had on the war
on fraud? What practices and behaviors of the DOJ and the
relator's bar do the two pleadings standards incentivize? And if
the relaxed standard paves the road to recoveries, then why did
117 See Rolls-Royce, 570 F3d at 854 ("We don't think it essential for a relator to
produce the invoices (and accompanying representations) at the outset of the suit.").
118 Associated Anesthesiologists, 2014 WL 4198199 at *12.
119 Takeda Pharmaceuticals,707 F3d at 457.
120 Id at 461.
121 See, for example, Ortho Biotech, 579 F3d at 29.
122 See id.
123 For a thorough analysis and history of the Rule 9(b) pleading standard in FCA
litigation, see Boese, 2 Civil False Claims § 5.04 at 5-64 to -116.2 (cited in note 36).
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the DOJ object to a proposed 2007 FCA amendment that would
have exempted qui tam complaints from Rule 9(b)'s heightened
pleading standard altogether?124

III. HOW A STRICT STANDARD SERVES THE FCA's OBJECTIVES
Almost all scholarship addressing this circuit split has
vigorously defended the relaxed standard, relying on the basic
proposition that a relaxed standard yields more recoveries and
thus contributes to stronger fraud enforcement and deterrence.125
The analysis undertaken by prior scholarship has rested
primarily on drawing thin lines in the nebulous and shifting
landscape of FCA fact patterns. This Comment seeks to analyze
the circuit split using an entirely different framework and
methodology.
This Part investigates the merits of the strict standard on the
basis of the FCA in practice, drawing on theoretical literature on
pleading practice and new empirical data obtained through a
2015 FOIA request. 126 Specifically, this Part argues that the strict
standard best aligns the incentives of the DOJ and relators and
that it avoids the systemic inefficiencies of a relaxed standard.
The new FOIA data set contributes to this analysis by showing
that the relaxed standard has had no demonstrable effect on
fraud deterrence, enforcement, or recovery. This Part also
introduces a model that demonstrates that the strict standard
does not diminish relators' incentives to file high-quality qui tam
suits. Rather, the strict standard serves as a much-needed
124 See generally Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Letter to the Honorable John Conyers Jr, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
US House of Representatives (July 15, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/U6HZ-W66E.
125 See, for example, Helmer, False Claims Act at 575-78 (cited in note 38); Vann
Bentley, Note, Getting Particular:Finding the Appropriate False Claims Act Pleading
Standard Post-Nathan v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals, 13 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol 129, 141
(2015) (claiming that the strict standard is inconsistent with the text of the FCA as well
as with Rule 9(b)); Emily T. Chen, Note, Depressing Diagnosis: Stringent Particularity
Requirement of the Rule 9(b) Pleading Standardas a CriticalBar to Off-Label Promotion
Fraud Whistleblowers, 36 Cardozo L Rev 333, 340 (2014) ("[A) stringent particularity
pleading requirement presents a prohibitively high bar for healthcare fraud
whistleblowers."); Aaron Rubin, Comment, To PresentBills or Not to Present?An In-Depth
Analysis of the Burden of Pleading in Qui Tam Suits, 8 Seton Hall Cir Rev 467, 503 (2012)
(advocating the First Circuit's balance between the "stringent bill presentment standard"
and the "precariously lax standard" in Kanneganti and Rolls-Royce); Mitchell, Comment,
4 Liberty U L Rev at 340 (cited in note 41) ("This [relaxed] standard fulfills the purposes
of imposing particularized pleading, while also satisfying the purposes underlying the
FCA itself.").
126 See note 30 and accompanying text.
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screening mechanism to ensure that the habitually resourceconstrained DOJ is not flooded with low-quality tips. Moreover,
the model's findings have broader implications for FCA reform in
general. This Comment concludes that, counterintuitively, a
strict Rule 9(b) standard deters and punishes fraud more
effectively than its relaxed counterpart.
A.

The Relaxed Standard Has Not Aided Fraud Enforcement

In the mid-2000s, several circuits began applying strict
pleading standards.127 Then, in the late 2000s, the First, Fifth,
and Ninth Circuits became the first to adopt a relaxed standard.128
By the early 2010s, most circuits had adopted some version of the
relaxed standard. Given the distinct shifts in the pleading rules
across the circuits, one might expect corresponding variations in
case outcomes.
The FOIA data set, however, shows that the respective
standard of each circuit appears to have had no significant effect
on actual case outcomes. Table 1 depicts the total number of
declined qui tam suits that successfully obtained recoveries; these
totals are broken down by circuit and by a series of four-year time
periods extending from 1999 to 2014. The tallies of total
successful declined suits are accompanied by a specific recovery
rate in percentage form, depicting how many declined suits
obtained a recovery out of the total number of declined qui tam
complaints for each circuit and time period.129

127

See Part II.A. See also Sylvia, False Claims Act §§ 10:58-59 at 606-25 (cited in

note 8).
See note 94 and accompanying text.
The numerators are based on the date on which recovery was obtained, and the
denominators are based either on the date on which recovery was obtained (for successful
declined claims) or on the case's "end date" (for unsuccessful declined claims). By avoiding
measurements based on filing date or election date, these generated figures ensure that
the recent data are not distorted through right censoring. See notes 31-32.
128
129
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TABLE 1. TOTAL SUCCESSFUL DECLINED SUITS AND RECOVERY
RATES PER TIME PERIOD AND CIRCUIT

lst Cir
2d Cir
3d Cir
4th Cir
5th Cir
6th Cir

7th Cir
8th Cir
9th Cir
10th Cir
11th Cir
DC Cir
Total

1999-2002

2003-2006

0 1 0.0%
5 1 14.3%

0
3

8
13.8%
13
19.7%
7 I 8.6%
6 I 8.6%
11.1%
4
6
9.0%
9.2%
14
20.0%
10
8.5%
10
23 7.4%

5
4
1
4

85

10.9%

0.0%
8.6%

I 11.6%

2007-2010

2011-2014

Total

1 8.3%

6 1 10.5%
7.5%
6

6.7%
9.8%

2
6

10.9%

1

7.1%
4.4%

9.8%
9.6%

5.1%

6.0%

6.3%
1.0%
6.9%

9.4%
6
71 11.9%
11
9.9%
6 1 6.9%

7
5

4.9%

6.4%

5

8.8%

7

12.1%

10 ! 12.3%

11.2%

1
10
2
7
2

2.3%
6.9%
4.1%
5.6%

4 1 4.7%

6.6%

44

6.7%
5.7%

7
7

j

j

5

i 10.9%

13

8.2%

8

45.5

7.1%

0
10
3

0.0%
7.6%
10.7%

6

12.0%
6.8%
5.6%

7.3%
7.1%
7.0%

76

8.3%

13
4
83

6.5%

The first and most obvious observation is the low number of
successful declined suits. Since 1999, fewer than 300 declined
FCA suits have been successful out of a total of 3,819 declined
suits. While the total number of winning declined suits has
recovered somewhat from a tumble in the mid-2000s, the overall
recovery rate has been in steady decline since the early 1990s.130

The low absolute number of recoveries is not new information;
however, it has never before been catalogued in a manner that
permits cross circuit comparisons.
For the purpose of more closely analyzing the effects that the
relaxed and strict standards have had on case outcomes over the
past decade, the following two tables provide a circuit-specific
breakdown of recovery rates for declined claims in the Fifth
Circuit (before and after United States v Kanneganti,131 decided
on April 8, 2009) and the Ninth Circuit (before and after Ebeid v
Lungwitz,132 decided on August 9, 2010). For both tables, the
recovery rates of declined claims from the Second, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits serve as an experimental control or
benchmark. 133
See Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1718-20 (cited in note 29).
131 565 F3d 180 (5th Cir 2009).
132 616 F3d 993 (9th Cir 2010).
133 The Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits serve as the control group, as they
represent the clearest and longest-lasting application of the strict standard. While the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not indicated where it stands
in the circuit split, the district courts of the Second Circuit have applied a strict standard
130
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TABLE 2. RECOVERY RATES FOR DECLINED CLAIMS (TOTAL
SUCCESSFUL DECLINED SUITS IN PARENTHESES) IN THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT AND IN STRICT-STANDARD CIRCUITS IN PRE-KANNEGANTI
AND POST-KANNEGANTI TIME PERIODS

Pre-Kanneganti
Recovery Rate of
Declined Claims
(recovery date from
1/1/1999 to 4/8/2009)

Post-Kanneganti
Recovery Rate of
Declined Claims
(recovery date from
4/9/2009 to 12/31/2014)

Strict

2d Cir

11.7% (12)

7.7% (8)

Standard

8th Cir

5.8% (8)

7.8% (8)

11th Cir

7.1% (22)

6.8% (18)

5th Cir

6.3% (15)

5.6% (11)

Relaxed
Standard

TABLE 3. RECOVERY RATES FOR DECLINED CLAIMS (TOTAL
SUCCESSFUL DECLINED SUITS IN PARENTHESES) IN THE NINTH
CIRCUIT AND IN STRICT-STANDARD CIRCUITS IN PRE-EBEID AND
POST-EBEID TIME PERIODS

Strict
Standard

Relaxed
Standard

Pre-Ebeid Recovery
Rate of Declined
Claims (recovery
date from 1/1/1999 to
8/9/2010)

Post-EbeidRecovery
Rate of Declined Claims
(recovery date from
8/10/2010 to
12/31/2014)

2d Cir
8th Cir

10.7% (13)
5.9% (9)

8.2% (7)
7.6% (7)

11th Cir

6.8% (25)

7.4% (15)

9th Cir

7.7% (34)

5.8% (11)

almost unanimously since at least 2005. See, for example, United States v Americare, Inc,
2013 WL 1346022, *3 (EDNY) (collecting cases); United States v Sikorsky Aircraft Corp,
2005 WL 1925903, *3-4 (D Conn). More recently, the Eighth Circuit relaxed its pleading
standard in United States v PlannedParenthoodof the Heartland,765 F3d 914 (8th Cir
2014). However, the Eight Circuit serves as a particularly good benchmark, because it
applied a strict standard without interruption between 2006 and 2014. See, for example,
In re Baycol Products Litigation, 732 F3d 869, 880 (8th Cir 2013).
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The shocking observation, intimated by Table 1 and made
clear in Tables 2 and 3, is the apparent absence of a correlation
between a circuit's pleading standard and its respective case
outcomes. Contrary to the claims of its proponents, the relaxed
standard-at least as applied in the Fifth and Ninth Circuitshas not ushered in a host of meritorious claims brought by
relators without government intervention.
Table 2 shows that while the circuits applying a strict
standard witnessed an overall drop in the recovery rates of
declined claims over the second time period, the Fifth Circuit
witnessed a similar drop in the success rate of such cases.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's absolute post-Kanneganti
recovery rate of 5.6 percent is noticeably lower than the rates of
its sister circuits. Turning to Table 3, the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits actually saw an increase in recovery rates of declined
claims across the two time periods. In contrast, the recovery rate
of declined claims in the Ninth Circuit suffered a drop postEbeid-similar to the drop in the Fifth Circuit post-Kanneganti.
And also similar to the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit's absolute
post-Ebeid recovery rate of 5.8 percent is lower than that of its
stricter sister circuits.
The primary observation derived from the cross circuit data
is that the relaxed pleading rule, at least when measured in terms
of case outcomes, does not appear to be doing much work. The
import of these figures is strengthened by consideration of the fact
that relators' counsel likely perform an additional gatekeeping
function.134 To that extent, even if Tables 1-3 were to show a
positive correlation between a relaxed pleading standard and
recovery rates, such a correlation could be partially attributable
to self-selection bias. For example, a relator in the Fifth Circuit is
more likely to proceed after declination on the basis of
nonparticularized allegations than a similarly situated relator in
the Second Circuit.
Although these results appear quite compelling and beckon
further analysis, a note of caution is in order. These findings are
not meant to serve as hard proof regarding the merits or failings
of either pleading standard. Rather, they serve as granular
anecdotal evidence within the scope of this Comment's larger
claims. Formal statistical and regression analyses are unavailing
134 See William H.J. Hubbard, Two Models of Pleading *7 (Oct 21, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/2542.7EMK (describing the gatekeeping function of attorneys, who apply
their resources to claims with the highest perceived merit).
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for three reasons. First, the time periods used in Tables 2 and 3
may have inaccurately captured some cases that had Rule 9(b)
rulings prior to the cut-off date and outcomes after the cut-off
date. The cross circuit comparisons are provided to compensate
for the fact that each circuit's individual before-and-after recovery
rates may be misleading. Second, measuring a time series may
result in spurious regressions-correlation may be mistaken for
causation, particularly when the subject matter is fraught with
manifold variables. Finally, the limited sample size of successful
declined suits deprives any formal analysis of strong statistical
value. For example, had four or five more declined claims
succeeded post-Kanneganti in the Fifth Circuit or post-Ebeid in
the Ninth Circuit, the results would be skewed in the opposite
direction. To this extent, it bears repeating that the declined case
recovery rates are meant to serve merely as anecdotal evidence.135
Despite these statistical limitations, this anecdotal evidence
provides several takeaways regarding the relationship between
the performance of declined claims under various pleading
standards. First, these findings suggest that if the relaxed
pleading standard is doing any work, it is occurring on an entirely
different plane than litigation outcomes. Second, given the
absence of a correlation between pleading standards and case
outcomes, the results suggest that the merits of the pleading
standards ought to be assessed from alternative viewpoints-for
example, by investigating how the pleading standards affect
systemic efficiency and the incentives of FCA actors.
B.

Information Sharing, Incentives, and Gamesmanship

One of the most significant justifications offered for relaxing
the pleading standard is a concern that the particularized details
are exclusively within the defendant's control and knowledge.136
However, the recently expanded use of Civil Investigative
Demands (CIDs) and the new statutory framework for
information sharing between the DOJ and relators raise doubts
regarding the actual degree of information asymmetry in FCA
litigation.

135 For information related to the difficulties of measuring FCA litigation in general,
see Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1716, 1718-19 nn 88, 92 (cited in note 29); Kwok, 42
Pub Cont L J at 238-40 (cited in note 27). See also Helmer, False Claims Act at 1079-80
(cited in note 38).
136 See Sylvia, False Claims Act § 10:58 at 614-15 & n 19 (cited in note 8).
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1. CIDs and information sharing.
The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009137 (FERA)
enhanced the government's ability to investigate a potential FCA
violation while the complaint remains under seal-that is, before
the DOJ elects to intervene.138 The DOJ has the authority to
conduct CIDs at any point prior to intervention as a form of preelection discovery.'13 Thus, the road map for an FCA complaint is
as follows: the relator files a complaint under seal, the DOJ
investigates the defendant for months or years using CIDs and
other pre-election discovery tools, the DOJ then elects whether to
intervene, and if it does, the complaint is subsequently unsealed
and served on the defendant. Although the relator's complaint is
meant to supplement the DOJ's information by identifying the
fraud underlying the claims and explaining how they are false, a
well-pleaded qui tam complaint should ideally point the DOJ in
the direction of the allegedly false claims. Whereas plaintiffs in
other settings use complaints to signal the strength of their
claims to defendants in an attempt to reach mutually beneficial
settlements, 14o an FCA relator's complaint primarily seeks to
signal its strength to the government and aid the government's
investigation.
The CID powers were originally passed to "enable the
Government to determine whether enough evidence existed to
warrant the expense of filing suit, as well as to prevent the
into
court
being dragged
defendant
from
potential
unnecessarily."'1' The CID discovery powers are broad and
include the power to demand production of documents, oral
testimony, and answers to interrogatories.142 CIDs now
supplement the DOJ's preexisting means to obtain documentary
137 Pub L No 111-21, 123 Stat 1617, codified in various sections of Titles 18 and 31.
138 31 USC § 3733(a)(1). FERA did not alter the substantive CID powers, but rather
corrected a procedural blockade: the Attorney General no longer needs to personally sign
off on each use of a CID but may now delegate the CID powers. The DOJ accordingly
redelegated CID powers to all US Attorneys. See generally US Department of Justice,
Redelegation of Authority of Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, to Branch
Directors, Heads of Offices and United States Attorneys in Civil Division Cases, 75 Fed
Reg 14070 (2010), amending 28 CFR § 0.160 et seq.
139 See 31 USC § 3733(a)(1).
140 See Hubbard, Two Models of Pleading at *6-7 (cited in note 134) ("[A] factually
and legally detailed complaint is the strongest signal that a plaintiff can send that he has
front-loaded the costs of legal and factual investigation.").
141 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-660, 99th Cong, 2d Sess
26 (1986).
142 See 31 USC § 3733(f)-(h).
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evidence through grand jury subpoenas, Inspector General
subpoenas, authorized investigative demands under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,143 and
subpoenas under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989.144
The DOJ is sufficiently incentivized to take advantage of the
CID powers. This is because if the government fails to intervene,
any later claims it wishes to bring with respect to the alleged
fraud are precluded.145 Moreover, if the DOJ fails to intervene and
the relator loses the suit, neither a second relator nor the United
States may bring a repeated suit on the same claims.146 Indeed,
the DOJ thoroughly investigates every qui tam complaint it
147
receives, as required by statute.
In the last five years, the expanded CID powers under FERA
have offered the government and relators a new strategic
informational advantage in FCA litigation. The use of CIDs has
increased more than twentyfold since FERA was implemented,
with nearly one thousand CIDs issued per year. 148 CIDs are a form
of administrative subpoena, 149 and thus the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) do not govern their issuance or form. 156 While

143

Pub L No 104-191, 110 Stat 1936, codified in various sections of Titles 26, 29,

and 42.
144 Pub L No 101-73, 103 Stat 183. See also Suzanne E. Durrell, The Relator's Role in
False Claims Act Investigations: Towards a New Paradigm*10 (TAF Conference Report,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/M4LH-VGP2.
145 See United States v City of New York, New York, 556 US 928, 936 (2009).
146 See United States v Rolls-Royce Corp, 570 F3d 849, 853 (7th Cir 2009).
147 See 31 USC § 3730(a) ("The Attorney General diligently shall investigate a
violation under section 3729."). See also Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for
Less: The Department of Justice's Command Performance under the 1986 False Claims
Amendments Act, 7 Admin L J Am U 409, 444 & n 162 (1993) (noting the extensive amount
of time that Civil Division attorneys spend investigating qui tam complaints).
148 See US Department of Justice, Acting Assistant Attorney General Stuart F. Delery
Speaks at the American Bar Association's Ninth National Institute on the Civil False
Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement (June 7, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/CG7H
-KQUU (noting that almost nine hundred CIDs issued in 2011-more than ten times the
number of CIDs issued in the two years prior to FERA's enactment); ProtectingAmerican
Taxpayers: Significant Accomplishments and Ongoing Challenges in the Fight against
Fraud,Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary*7 (Jan 26, 2011), archived
at http://perma.cc/4MWN-HMKZ (statement of Tony West, Assistant Attorney General for
the Civil Division of the Department of Justice) ("[D]uring the fourth quarter of 2010,
Department attorneys requested authority to issue over 500 CIDs, which [was] more than
six times the number of CIDs requested during the two preceding years combined."). These
figures do not include the number of informal disclosures that are taking place.
149 See United States v Witmer, 835 F Supp 201, 205 (MD Pa 1993).
150 See Boese, 2 Civil False Claims § 5.07[A] at 5-161 (cited in note 36). See also

United States v Markwood, 48 F3d 969, 982 (6th Cir 1995) ("[The FRCP] were written for
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the CID powers do not permit the production of materials that
would be protected from disclosure under the FRCP,151 and while
CID recipients may petition to set aside CID requests that are
noncompliant with the FCA or with "any constitutional or other
legal right or privilege,"152 CIDs are a type of nonreciprocal, onesided discovery that can continue for years and can cost FCA
targets millions in CID compliance costs. 153 That is, while the DOJ
may investigate and obtain expansive access to an FCA
defendant, the defendant has no reciprocal ability to respond with
its own discovery requests.
The CID authority was originally interpreted to include a
general prohibition on sharing such information with relators or
relators' counsel.154 Yet FERA broadened the information-sharing
powers of the DOJ, allowing any information obtained through
CIDs to be shared with relators.155 Relators are now broadly
permitted to incorporate particularized information from CID
findings in their amended complaints for the purpose of
complying with Rule 9(b).156 Unlike grand jury testimony, which

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) prohibits from
disclosure,157 CID testimony may be shared with and used by
relators in the event of declination.158 The information shared by
the DOJ that was acquired through interagency inquiries and
post-complaint litigation. Most of the [FRCP] are simply inapplicable to the pre-complaint
enforcement of an administrative subpoena.").
151 See 31 USC § 3733(b)(1).
152 31 USC § 37330j)(2).
153 See Kathleen McDermott and Holly C. Barker, Modern False ClaimsAct Practice
- It Ain't the Same Since It All Changed *2 (American Health Lawyer's Association, Oct
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/TH54-PUNH. See also United States v Witmer, 835 F
Supp 208, 221-22 (MD Pa 1993) (describing the breadth of the CID powers).
154 See Boese, 2 Civil False Claims § 5.07[A] at 5-163 & n 597 (cited in note 36).
155 See 31 USC § 3733(a)(1) ('Any information obtained ... under this section may be
shared with any qui tam relator if .
it is necessary as part of any false claims act
investigation.").
156 See, for example, United States v Genentech, Inc, 720 F Supp 2d 671, 680 (ED Pa
2010) (finding "no authority ...
barring amendments based on discovery the relator
obtained from the Government"). See also United States v Continental Common, Inc, 553
F3d 869, 873 & n 6 (5th Cir 2008); United States v LaboratoryCorp of America, Inc, 290
F3d 1301, 1314 & n 25 (11th Cir 2002); United States v Organon USA Inc, 2011 WL
794915, *1 (D Mass).
157 FRCrP 6(e).
158 See Karen F. Green and James J. Fauci, Testify First, Know Why Later:
Responding to Civil Investigative Demands for Testimony in False Claims Act Cases *301,
306 (Financial Fraud Law Report, April 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5RW2-WW8J
(noting that testimony obtained through CIDs may be used at trial under the hearsay
exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)). See also Durrell, Relator's Role at *11
(cited in note 144).
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CID discovery should strongly aid the relator in identifying
59
specific false claims.1
2. Interpreting declination in light of the expanded CID
powers.
There are four common interpretations of DOJ declination.
First, it might signify that the case is meritless. That is,
intervention might serve as a "merits-signaling" device.160 Second,
DOJ intervention might be random and the higher success rates
in intervened cases might be due to the DOJ's leverage. That is,
intervention might serve as a "merits-making" device.161 Third,
declination might correlate with the DOJ's shielding of politically
connected companies.162 Fourth, intervention might be driven by
a cost-benefit analysis particularly affected by the DOJ's resource
constraints, in which case declination would not signal that the
16
case is meritless.
Recent empirical scholarship has found no support for the
view that intervention is an arbitrary "merits-making" decision
or a politicized decision.164 While the DOJ has stronger meritscreening abilities than often assumed,165 there are a vast number
of strategic and resource-bound factors that often control an

159 Section 6002 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (also known as the
"Physician Payments Sunshine Act") has also provided relators with a new tool. Pub L No
111-148, 124 Stat 119, 689 (2010), codified at 42 USC § 1320a-7h. In September 2014, the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services published an online database in compliance
with the Physician Payments Sunshine Act. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, Open Payments, archived at http://perma.cc/6H4V-JVZA. The database includes
the details of payments by the pharmaceutical and medical supply industries to hospitals
or doctors. This database should provide relators with particularized information to
bolster the allegations in their complaints.
160 Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1693-94 & n 17, 1706, 1712 & n 71 (cited in note
29) (listing cases and scholarship). See also Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians:
Accountability in Qui Tam Litigation under the Civil False Claims Act, 41 Pub Cont L J
813, 826 (2012); Broderick, Note, 107 Colum L Rev at 975 (cited in note 54).
161 Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1689, 1694-95 & n 18 (cited in note 29).
162 See id at 1695 & n 19.
163 See id at 1694 n 17, 1732. The DOJ faces continual budgetary and resource
limitations. See Durrell, Relator's Role at *2 (cited in note 144).
164 Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1749-50 (cited in note 29) (concluding that the DOJ
is not "solely a merits maker that arbitrarily places the enormous weight of the
government behind cases and drives them to settlement," but rather that the DOJ has a
strong ability to "screen cases on merit grounds").
165 See id ('The analysis mostly rejects heated claims that DOJ decisionmaking has a
partisan political cast or is unconnected to case merit.").
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intervention election.166 These findings suggest that if the DOJ
uncovers particularized information related to the alleged fraud
but elects not to intervene, it will employ the information-sharing
provisions of the FCA in one of two ways.
First, perhaps the DOJ uncovers particularized information
related to the fraud but larger social, political, or financial
considerations warrant declination.167 In such cases, the DOJ
exercises a function that private relators cannot perform. As
gatekeeper, the DOJ may decline to intervene when the suit, for
example, would cause irreparable damage to a key government
contractor, expose the affected agency to reputational damage, or
reap a short-term windfall at the cost of long-term inefficiency.168
Unlike the DOJ, the relator will bring suit when his expected
return exceeds his private expected cost, "even where the social
cost of enforcement . . .exceeds the social benefit.169 While the
DOJ as a public enforcer is able to exercise the tool of
discretionary nonenforcement, relators by their very nature are
interested in little more than the bounty and whatever intangible
personal or moral gain they seek.170 This leads to a social loss.171

166 See id at 1733-37 (finding DOJ resource constraints to be one of the strongest
factors negatively affecting the likelihood of intervention, along with "judicial threats to
its ability to police collusive settlements, or the defendant's identity").
167 See id at 1715.

168 See Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1735 (cited in note 29) (finding that the DOJ is
7 percent less likely to intervene in suits against Fortune 100 companies and 8 percent
less likely to intervene in suits against top defense contractors).
169 Id at 1697. See also Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1254 (cited in note 29).
170 Courts have upheld DOJ dismissal of qui tam suits as long as the reason for
dismissal is rationally related to a legitimate purpose, such as promoting goodwill among
industry competitors and regulators, preventing leaks of classified information, protecting
national security, and conserving enforcement resources. See DOJ's Quid Pro Quo with
St. Paul: A Whistleblower's Perspective; Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Economic Growth, Job Creationand Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform and the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the
Committee on Judiciary, 113th Cong, 1st Sess 56, 62 (2013) (statement of Shelley R. Slade,
Partner, Vogel, Slade & Goldstein, LLP).
171 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The PrivateEnforcement of Law, 4
J Legal Stud 1, 38-41 (1975) (noting that "enforcer nullification" and "discretionary
nonenforcement"-tools unavailable to private enforcers-play an important role in
limiting social loss); Ben Depoorter and Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic
Analysis of the False Claims Act, 14 Sup Ct Econ Rev 135, 151-61 (2006) (examining the
social loss in the under- and overprovision of whistleblowing litigation and the socially
suboptimal private timing of whistleblowing). See also Steven Shavell, The Social versus
the PrivateIncentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J Legal Stud 333, 333-39
(1982) (modeling the divergence between the private and social incentives to bring suit);
Kolis, Comment, 7 Admin L J Am U at 435-39 (cited in note 147) (evaluating how the qui
tam regime disrupts the optimal level of fraud enforcement).
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In such cases, the DOJ may decline to share any CID or
interagency findings with the relator or may even exercise its
statutory right to terminate the suit.72
Second, perhaps the DOJ investigation uncovers some
instances of fraud, yet the cost of intervening-including the lost
opportunity costs related to the investigation from the constant
stream of new and potentially high-value tips coming in from
whistleblowers-outweighs the expected value of an asserted
claim, discounted by the probability of recovery. 1 3 As a welfaremaximizing agency, the DOJ still profits greatly from
postdeclination litigation. Although few declined cases succeed,
the DOJ is still incentivized to provide the relator with any
particularized results of CID and interagency findings uncovered
during its investigation, and to thereby reclaim some value from
the sunk costs of its investigation. Such information can bolster
the factual particularity of the relator's amended complaint and
can thereby increase the likelihood of recovery. It follows that the
expanded CID usage under the FERA amendments may provide
high-quality claims with sufficient firepower to survive motions
to dismiss when the DOJ declines intervention for resourceconstraint reasons. 74 Thus, this expanded system of pre-election
investigations gives new reasons to doubt the concerns of
information asymmetry that are pivotal to the application of the
17
relaxed pleading standard.
3. The dangers of proxy and capture.
When considering the FOIA data showing that a relaxed
pleading standard has had no positive effect on case outcomes as
applied in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,176 it is instructive to
examine the kind of strategic-and potentially unwantedbehaviors that a relaxed standard incentivizes. If courts apply a
pleading standard to declined claims that is more relaxed than
the standard applied to intervened claims, the DOJ may treat this
See 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A).
See Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1694 n 17 (cited in note 29) (describing courts
that conclude declination is driven at least in part by a cost-benefit analysis).
174 See Laura Hough, Note, Finding Equilibrium: Exploring Due Process Violations
in the Whistleblower Provisions of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 19
Wm & Mary Bill Rts J 1061, 1080-81 (2011) ("whereas, before, the relator would not have
had the full advantage of Government resources ...now the relator ...acting as a private
party, has a plethora of additional information to use in its case.").
175 See Part II.B.
176 See Part III.A.
172
173
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as an invitation for gamesmanship by using relator counsel as a
proxy enforcer. The Eleventh Circuit noted this concern directly:
"Permitting a qui tam relator to go forward with his complaint,
when we would not allow the government to proceed, might
encourage the government to evade its [pleading] burden by
merely recruiting a willing relator to file a qui tam action."'177
There are three situations in which proxy enforcement may
constitute a viable strategy: (1) when the DOJ believes that a qui
tam complaint has merit, but the costs of investigation and
intervention outweigh the suit's expected value; (2) when the DOJ
is unable during its investigation to acquire the facts necessary to
make particularized allegations; or (3) when the DOJ wishes to
conserve resources by forgoing a thorough investigation into a
case of questionable merits. In these three situations, the DOJ
could simply provide an insider relator with as much information
as it was able to gather through CIDs or interagency queries,
instruct relator counsel to continue the suit past the motion to
dismiss, and potentially intervene after the relator was able to
clear the relaxed pleading hurdle on the basis of his insider
78
status.
This argument assumes that courts do not treat declination
as an unequivocal signal that the relator's claims lack merit. As
noted earlier, declination may result from a variety of factors,
such as the DOJ's well-known resource constraints. 179 Due to the
fear of negative precedent and other concerns, the DOJ has been
increasingly filing "statements of interest" in declined cases. 180
Such filings serve to inform the court of its stance on any
substantive issues at stake in the case and may include an
explanation that its limited resources forced it to decline
intervention-thereby concealing the scent of low merit.
This argument also assumes that a level of collaboration
exists between the DOJ and relator counsel to such a degree that
proxy enforcement constitutes a viable strategy. Although
177 United States v McInteer, 470 F3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir 2006). See also Depoorter
and De Mot, 14 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 150 (cited in note 171) (noting the government's
incentive to free ride and avoid litigation costs by declining intervention).
178 If the DOJ declines to intervene, the FCA permits the DOJ, on a showing of good
cause, to intervene at a later time after expiration of the seal period. 31 USC § 3730(c)(3).
See also Boese, 1 Civil False Claims § 4.05[A] at 4-231 to -232 (cited in note 36).
179 See Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1712-15 (cited in note 29).
180 See Boese, 1 Civil False Claims § 4.05[D) at 4-238 (cited in note 36). See also Marc
S. Raspanti and Meredith S. Auten, Why Is Qui Tam Litigation Often So Difficult to
Resolve? *24-25 (American Health Lawyers Association, Sept 2011), archived at
http:llperma.cc/7PP3-ABV4.
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regulatory capture certainly exists between industry players and
the affected agencies, a different type of regulatory capture occurs
at the decisionmaking level relevant to the pleading analysis. In
its FCA enforcement, the DOJ frequently does business with the
same repeat law firms.181 Relator counsel and the DOJ are
partners in a multibillion-dollar industry, and a battle-ready
relator's bar has emerged in the last two decades to reap the
profits of whistleblowing.182 Strikingly, a highly experienced
relator counsel is 30 percent more likely to obtain DOJ
intervention than the average relator counsel.83 Even more
striking is the intervention rate in suits in which the relator is
represented by counsel who previously worked for the DOJ. The
government intervenes in 52.7 percent of the qui tam suits
represented by former DOJ attorneys, more than double the
84
average intervention rate.
These two figures might initially suggest that the
government is not employing the proxy strategy of delegating
enforcement to experienced counsel via declination. However,
these figures may counterintuitively indicate a sub rosa
delegation, given that intervention is often conditioned on an
experienced firm's promises of providing resources to aid the
investigation.185 Everybody wins: the experienced counsel takes
the lead in the resource-intensive suit, and in exchange the DOJ's
intervention serves a merits-signaling function to the judge in the
parties' efforts to extract a settlement. The parties are likely
sophisticated enough to know when and where the opposite
strategy will work to their advantage-that is, when declination
(or delayed intervention) is the best approach in a circuit that
relaxes its pleading standard for an insider relator's declined suit.
On the one hand, one might wonder why the DOJ would ever

181 For data illustrating the robust repeat play, see Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at
1299, 1302 (cited in note 29). See also David Kwok, Coordinated Private and Public
Enforcement of Law: Deterrence under Qui Tam *15 (Feb 8, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/AVZ9-LYUG.
182 See Raspanti and Auten, Qui Tam Litigation at *23 (cited in note 180).
183 See Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1299 (cited in note 29) (finding an intervention

rate of 37.1 percent for counsel that had brought at least forty prior cases).
184 See id at 1306.
185 See Engstrom, 107 Nw U L Rev at 1728 & n 110 (cited in note 29). See also Kwok,
CoordinatedPrivateand Public Enforcement of Law at *15 (cited in note 181) (noting that
the DOJ sometimes conditions its intervention on the participation of a specific qui tam
specialist firm); Durrell, Relator's Role at *7, 13 (cited in note 144) (noting how the role of
relator counsel has expanded in recent years to include major responsibilities related to
both investigation and postintervention litigation).
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experiment with a strategy that risks potentially meritorious
legal claims by sending them to run the booby-trapped gauntlet
of declination: relator counsel may ineffectively enforce the
claims, a motion to dismiss may deliver a fatal deathblow to the
suit, or declination may send an unequivocal signal to the
defendant that it should not settle. On the other hand, as the
number of qui tam suits continues to rise, necessity may compel
the DOJ to seek out such strategies when intervening in every
case is simply not economically feasible.
Finally, it is important to identify why such delegation and
gamesmanship are actually undesirable in the fight against
fraud. First, while the relationship between the DOJ and relator
counsel described above does not fit into traditional definitions of
regulatory or agency capture, it is still problematic as it may lead
to inefficient enforcement.186 As described, highly experienced
relator counsel is 30 percent more likely-and former DOJ
insiders are over 100 percent more likely-to obtain DOJ
intervention than the average relator counsel.187 One could
imagine that these correlations are due in part to such relatorside counsel's skill in identifying high-merit cases and signaling
accordingly to the DOJ. Shockingly, however, the average
recovery amount obtained by former DOJ insiders is nearly half
the average recovery amount obtained by noninsider counsel188
This result suggests that the DOJ is utilizing intervention to
serve the interests of favored relator counsel to the detriment of
the public interest. Such nepotism and capture within the context
of the FCA is particularly disturbing because it is precisely these
qui tam enforcers who were originally "thought to be best
equipped to serve, as many champions of private enforcement
hope, an agency-forcing or anticapture role."189 Regarding the
pleading standard, the agency capture suggests that at least visA-vis experienced relator counsel and former DOJ insiders, the
DOJ may be vigorously taking advantage of the FCA's
186 Regulatory capture typically focuses on the relationship between a regulator or
agency and the industry that it regulates, and thus it is not a perfect analogy to the FCA
context. However, as the relator's bar and the DOJ have been working together in the fight
against fraud for nearly thirty years, the line between capture and collaboration is a fine
one. One fitting definition in this context notes that captured agencies are "persistently
serving the interests of regulated industries to the neglect or harm of more general, or
'public,' interests." Paul J. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies 4
(Princeton 1981).
187 See notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
188 See Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1306-07 (cited in note 29).
189 Id at 1252 & n 24.
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information-sharing provisions. 19° This casts great doubt on the
claims of information asymmetry underlying the evolution of the
relaxed standard.191
Second, while delegation may be an effective form of
collaborative enforcement, it exploits the FCA's fee-shifting
provisions in a manner unintended by the legislature. Unlike the
DOJ, a relator can collect "reasonable attorneys' fees and costs"
from the defendant in the event of judgment or settlement,192
which incentivizes the DOJ to allow a trusted and experienced
relator counsel to take the lead in what appears to be a slam dunk
case. 193 This practice permits counsel to shoulder the costs of a
multimillion-dollar investigation,194 which is eventually recouped
from the defendant. Such gamesmanship disrupts the intended
amount of FCA liability as calculated by Congress in crafting the
provisions governing penalties and treble damages. Nothing in
the legislative record suggests that Congress envisioned the
investigative work to be shouldered by anyone other than the
government.195 While such delegation practices help the DOJ save
overhead costs and add another thumb to the scales of settlement,
they also bear tones of lawlessness and at the very least implicate
a concerning lack of accountability.196
C.

A Strict Standard Does Not Diminish the Relator's Filing
Incentives

In a 2014 amicus brief, the Solicitor General argued that
requiring qui tam complaints to identify specific false claims
"would not meaningfully assist the government's enforcement
190 See Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2.
191See Part II.B.
192 31 USC § 3730(d)(1)-(2).
193 While there are strong, crosscutting incentives for the DOJ to pursue such cases,
delegation may become or may already be an economic necessity as the number of filed
qui tam complaints grows each year. For an overview of relator counsel's expanding role
in FCA investigations, see generally Durrell, Relator'sRole (cited in note 144).
194 See Mathew Andrews, Note, The Growth of Litigation Finance in DOJ
Whistleblower Suits: Implicationsand Recommendations, 123 Yale L J 2422, 2434 & n 68
(2014) (citing instances of multimillion-dollar attorney's fees).
195 See, for example, HR Rep No 99-660 at 17 (cited in note 141) ("[Tlhe bill creates a
pre-lawsuit discovery mechanism, Civil Investigative Demands, to increase the
Government's ability to investigate False Claims Act cases.") (emphasis added).
196 See Jill E. Fisch, ClassAction Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff,60 L
& Contemp Probs 167, 194 (1997) ("One reason we care about [relator] interference [with
the executive branch's enforcement priorities] is accountability. Qui tam suits, like citizen
environmental and taxpayer suits, pose the question of whether it is legitimate or
advisable to delegate law enforcement power to those outside the political system.").
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efforts" but rather would "discourage the filing of qui tam suits by
relators-like those in [Kanneganti] and [Rolls-Royce]-who
would otherwise have the means and the incentives to expose
frauds against the United States."197 This Section presents a
model that refutes the Solicitor General's proposition198 and leads
to three findings. First, the model demonstrates that a strict
standard will not diminish relators' incentives to file qui tam
suits. Second, it shows that a relaxed standard may incentivize a
socially suboptimal number of new relators to file suit. Finally,
the model indicates that there is a heavily diluted relationship
between the pleading standard applied to declined suits and the
value of the suit at the time of filing. That is, the pleading
standard has only a muted effect on a relator's decision to blow
the whistle.
1. The model.
A relator will sue when the expected value of the suit (V) is
greater than the expected cost of suing (c)-that is, when:
V> c.

(1)

c equals the relator's total tangible and intangible cost of
blowing the whistle, including potential unemployment, stigma
and damage to his psyche, and expenditure of time and energy.
Yet due to a relator's unfamiliarity with civil procedure, the
pleading standard cannot conceivably affect his decision to
engage counsel. Because relator counsel functions as the first
screen to weed out low-merit cases, 19 9 counsel's incentives provide
a stronger analytical reference point. Counsel will pursue a
relator's case when the expected value of intervention (Vi) plus
the expected value of declination (VD) is greater than costs
197 Takeda Brief at *16 (cited in note 99). See also Kanneganti, 565 F3d at 191 (noting
that the strict standard "discourages whistleblowers ... from coming forward"); Foglia v
Renal Ventures Management, LLC, 754 F3d 153, 156-57 (3d Cir 2014) (relying extensively
on the Takeda Brief in adopting the relaxed standard).
198 This model builds off of existing theoretical literature on pleading. See William H.J.
Hubbard, A Fresh Look at PlausibilityPleading,83 U Chi L Rev *10-25 (forthcoming 2016),
archived at http://perma.cc/U7ET-273K For an FCA-specific economic model, see Depoorter
and De Mot, 14 Sup Ct Econ Rev at 153-56 (cited in note 171) (finding that the divergent
incentives of relators and the DOJ lead to socially suboptimal fraud enforcement).
199 See Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screening Value
of Qui Tam, 91 Wash U L Rev 1169, 1215 n 169 (2014) ("[C]ontingency fees for lawyers
can operate as a screening mechanism.... While the precise mechanism is different, the
screening effect is similar to that of qui tam.").
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incurred until the time the DOJ elects to intervene or decline
(co)-that is, when:
VI + VD > Co.

(2)

V equals the expected proceeds in the event of intervention
(PI) minus the expected net costs of intervention (NCi), and VD
equals the expected proceeds in the event of declination (PD)
minus the expected net costs of declination (NCD). That is:
V= - NC.
VD =P - NCD.

(3)
(4)

P equals the expected recovery in the event of intervention
(Ri), discounted by counsel's contingency fee (qi), the statutory
bounty in the event of intervention (Bi), the probability of
recovery in the event of intervention (rn), and the probability of
intervention (1). Analogously, P equals the expected recovery in
the event of declination (RD), discounted by counsel's contingency
fee (qo), the statutory bounty in the event of declination (BD), the
probability of recovery in the event of declination (R1D), and the
probability of declination (D). That is:
PI = pBIriRiL
b= qoBDR1DRDD.

(5)
(6)

Constants exist for most terms. The DOJ intervenes in only
23.4 percent of all qui tam suits.200 There is an 89.5 percent chance
of recovery in the event of intervention, and a 6.8 percent chance
of recovery in the event of declination.201 Successful intervened
claims generate an average statutory bounty of 17 percent, and
successful declined claims generate an average bounty of
25 percent. 202 Firms that specialize in FCA whistleblower suits
200 The average intervention rate from 2004 to 2014 was 23.4 percent. See note 31.
Although this figure might suggest that counsel is ill equipped to screen the merits of qui
tam cases, it should be noted that many complaints are voluntarily dismissed after filing.
Relators may abandon their cases upon learning that the DOJ is already investigating the
FCA target or that a jurisdictional bar prevents the suit from moving forward. See
Andrews, Note, 123 Yale L J at 2435-36 (cited in note 194). This result strengthens the
model's findings because a higher de facto intervention rate increases the value of
litigating an intervened suit as compared to the value of litigating a declined case.
201 See note 32 and accompanying text.
202 See Kwok, Coordinated Private and Public Enforcement of Law at *14 (cited in
note 181).

1596

The University of Chicago Law Review

[82:1559

charge a standard contingency fee of 40 percent. 203 Finally, the
FOIA data set shows that the median declined recovery is only
32.2 percent of the value of the median intervened recovery.20 4
TABLE 4. EXPECTED LITIGATION CONSTANTS FOR INTERVENED
AND DECLINED CASES
Probability
of
Recovery

Intervention

Probability of
Intervention/
Declination
(ID)
23.4%

Declination

76.6%

89.5%

Statutory
Bounty
(B)
17%

Contingency
Fee (9)
40%

Recovery
Measured
in Terms
of Ri
100%

6.8%

25%

40%

32.2%

(it)

Applying these constants as the discounted values in
Equations 5 and 6, the expected proceeds in the event of
intervention (Pi) equal 0.01424 times the expected value of
recovery in an intervened case (Ri), and the expected proceeds in
the event of declination (PD) equal 0.00167 times the expected
value of recovery in an intervened case (Ri). These values of Pi
and PD can be applied to Equations 3 and 4 as follows:
Vi = 0.01424R - NC.
VD = 0.00167Ri - NCD.

(7)
(8)

To put this into context, approximately 90 percent of the
expected proceeds from an FCA suit are derived from the
possibility of intervention, and 10 percent of the expected
proceeds are derived from the possibility of declination. However,
the varying costs associated with both intervention and
declination create a further divide between the value of
intervention and the value of declination. These net postelection
costs, NCi and NCD, can be broken down. The FCA contains a feeshifting provision that rewards relator counsel with litigation
costs in the event of successful recovery. 20 5 Thus, the cost of
See Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1281-82 & n 136 (cited in note 29).
These figures reflect the median recovery amounts obtained in settlements from
2002 to 2014, as reflected in the FOIA data. Median recovery amounts, rather than mean
amounts, are a more accurate benchmark as mean amounts are heavily skewed by several
high-value outlier recoveries.
205 See 31 USC § 3730(d)(1)-(2). Notably, the FCA expressly awards attorney's fees
and expenses for both judgments and settlements. See Boese, 1 Civil False Claims § 4.09[A]
at 4-312.1 to -315 (cited in note 36).
203
204

2015)
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litigating together with the DOJ (ci) will be incurred only when
the intervened suit fails, and thus must be discounted both by
89.5 percent (ri) and by the probability of intervention (1). The
expected amount of co that will be returned through the FCA's feeshifting provisions if the suit succeeds must be subtracted from
NCI, and also discounted by the probability of intervention (1).
Analogously, the cost of litigating alone (CD) will be incurred only
when the declined suit fails, and thus must be discounted both by
6.8 percent (lrD) and by the probability of declination (D). The
expected amount of co that will be returned through the FCA's feeshifting provisions if the declined suit succeeds must be
subtracted from NCD and also discounted by the probability of
declination (D). That is:

(9)

NCi =1 (1 - n) ci- Iico.
NCD = D (1 - 7rD) CD- D7TDCO.

(10)

Applying the constants from Table 4, the total expected net
costs of intervention (NCi) and declination (NCD) are as follows:
NCI = 0.025ci- 0.209co.
NCD = 0. 7 1 4 CD- 0.052co.

(11)
(12)

The expected net total costs of intervention (NCi) and
declination (NCD) can be inserted into Equations 7 and 8 as
follows:
Vi= 0.01424Ri - (0.025ci- 0.209co).
VD 0.00167Ri - (0. 7 14CD- 0.052c0).

(13)

(14)

The model nears completion. As shown in Equation 2, counsel
will sue when the expected value of intervention (Vi) plus the
expected value of declination (VD) is greater than the cost
incurred until DOJ election (co). Applying the previously
demonstrated measurements of Vi and VD in terms of the
estimated recovery (Ri) and costs of litigation (co, ci, CD), counsel
will sue when:
(0.01424Ri- (0.025ci- 0.209co)) + (0.00167Ri- (0.7 14CD-

0.052co)) > Co.

(15)

Some preliminary findings can be made regarding the model
presented in Equation 15. First, as previously noted, the expected
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proceeds from intervention (0.01424Ri) dwarf the expected
proceeds from declination (0.00167Ri) at a ratio of approximately
nine to one. Second, the low amount of costs associated with
intervention increases its financial attractiveness. That is, in the
event of intervention, the likelihood of recovery-and thus the
likelihood that fees and expenses are returned through the FCA's
fee-shifting provisions-means that counsel's pre- and
postintervention costs are both heavily discounted. By
comparison, the pre- and postdeclination costs are only slightly
discounted through the prospect of fee-shifting due to the low
recovery rate in declined suits.
2. Complications.
The model has two general complications. First, counsel's
investment of resources in a suit is not a binary on-off switch.
Rather, depending on how warmly the DOJ receives the relator's
promises of
with provisional
complaint-for
example,
intervention-counsel may invest more or fewer resources during
the pre-election investigation. For example, if the DOJ agrees to
intervene on the condition that the relator undertake a significant
portion of the investigation, counsel will naturally invest such
resources. This explains the phenomenon of seven-figure
preintervention investigations shouldered by relator counsel.206
By delegating investigative efforts to relator counsel in a strong
case, the DOJ and relator counsel are able to game the FCA's feeshifting provisions.207
This shortcoming, however, does not seriously affect the
model's findings. As explained below,208 the model shows that a
strict pleading standard will almost never discourage relators
from filing a suit in the first place. That later case developments
may encourage or discourage counsel from investing additional
resources does not change the fact that when the model's
conditions are fulfilled, counsel will-at a minimum-file a
complaint under seal and bring the fraud allegations to light.
The second complication relates to the questionable
exogeneity of the constants used in the model and following
hypotheticals, specifically the intervention and recovery
probabilities and the statutory bounty. For example, by investing

206

See note 194. See also generally Durrell, Relator'sRole (cited in note 144).

207

See Part III.B.

208

See Part III.C.3 and Part III.C.4.
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more resources, counsel can augment the expected probability of
intervention as well as the expected statutory bounty. Likewise,
the use of exogenous constants means that the model employs the
faulty assumption that relator counsel cannot gauge a case's
strength without the advice of the DOJ.
These constants are treated as exogenous for the purposes of
both the model and the following hypotheticals in order to make
the model tractable.29 The model can be used to analyze the effect
of changes to the pleading standard on hypothetical wealthmaximizing counsel. These effects can then be aggregated to the
entire population of the relator's bar, for whom the
aforementioned average constants may be larger or smaller in
each individual case. However, the model's value lies not in its
ability to predict under what financial conditions the relator will
sue. Rather, the model's primary value is descriptive: it depicts
the uneven relationship between the high value of intervention
on one side and the low value of declination on the other. By all
accounts, any value added to the suit through declination seems
to be merely a rounding error in counsel's calculation of whether
to file a qui tam suit.
3. Two hypotheticals.
Two hypotheticals demonstrate how the model stated in
Equation 15 functions, using the median and mean recovery
amounts in winning cases of $1.4 million and $17.5 million,
respectively.210 Of course, gauging the expected value of any
individual relator's claim is a difficult exercise. For example, the
relator may exaggerate his claim, counsel may suffer from its own
myopic optimism, or the estimated number of FCA violationswhich is pivotal to a settlement calculation-may be unknown.
These hypotheticals make the conservative assumption that
counsel's costs of litigation for all cost periods are identical (co =
CI = CD).

21 1

209 For a discussion of the use of assumptions to make descriptive economic models
tractable, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
InterdisciplinaryDiscourse on Law, 1997 Wis L Rev 389, 394-98.
210 See Engstrom, 112 Colum L Rev at 1289 (cited in note 29).
211 This cost assumption is conservative because it undervalues the cost of litigating
after declination. CD is likely much higher in reality due to necessary amendments to the
complaint and motion practice. Further, if the case moves to discovery or trial, CD may
increase astronomically.
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In the first case, counsel estimates an expected recovery at
the median recovery amount of $1.4 million and estimates costs
of $15,000 for each cost period. Applying the model from Equation
15, counsel will sue when:
(0.01424Ri - (0.025ci- 0.209co)) + (0.00167Ri- (0. 7 14cD- 0.052co)) > co.
($22,696) + (-$7,592) > $15,000

(16)

Here counsel will accept the relator's case because the
expected value of intervention ($22,696) exceeds the pre-election
cost (co). For such low-stakes claims, any decrease to the
probability of recovery in the event of declination (7rD)-for
example, by applying a strict Rule 9(b)-will not affect counsel's
filing decision, because the expected value of postdeclination
litigation is already nonpositive at the time of filing.
Note that the negative expected value of postdeclination
litigation (-$7,592) does not decrease the suit's value and has no
effect on the filing decision when the expected value of
intervention is greater than the pre-election costs (co). If the value
of declination remains negative at the time of election, counsel
can simply dismiss the case if the DOJ declines intervention.212
Indeed, approximately 25 percent of declined cases are
voluntarily dismissed by relators following declination.213 This
result suggests that declination is a type of "option" that the

relator buys into when he decides to

file.214

In this manner,

counsel is able to preemptively cap all potential declination losses
at zero.
In the second hypothetical case, counsel estimates an
expected recovery at the mean recovery amount of $17.5 million.
This hypothetical assumes increased litigation costs of $30,000
for each cost period.215 That is, counsel will sue when:
(0.01424Ri - (0.025ci- 0.209co)) + (0.00167Ri- (0.7 14CD- 0.052co)) > CO.

(17)

($254,720) + ($9,365) > $30,000.

212 See Helmer, False Claims Act at 622 (cited in note 38) (claiming that for relators
and their counsel, qui tam stands for "quit in the a.m." in the event of declination); id at
Appendix 4 (presenting a Representation Agreement that reserves the right to withdraw
in the event of declination).
213 See Kwok, CoordinatedPrivateand PublicEnforcement of Law at *13-14 (cited in
note 181).
214 For background on option models of litigation, see generally Bradford Cornell, The
Incentive to Sue: An Option-PricingApproach, 19 J Legal Stud 173 (1990).
215 See note 211 and accompanying text.
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Here, not only will counsel bring the suit, but the expected
value of litigating a declined suit ($9,365) adds value to his costbenefit analysis. However, even if VD were nonpositive, Vi would
still greatly outweigh counsel's pre-election costs (co).
In this higher-stakes claim, it is worth exploring how a strict
Rule 9(b) standard would affect the expected proceeds in the event
of declination (PD). For example, imagine that a strict standard
decreases the probability that a declined suit will obtain a
recovery (71D) by 10 percent. 216 Applying this to Equation 17, VD
would be decreased to $6,265, a difference of $3,100. That is, if a
strict standard decreases the probability of a declined claim
successfully obtaining a recovery by 10 percent, then the total
value of the suit at the time of filing is accordingly diminished by
1.2 percent. 217 There is thus a heavily diluted relationship
between the degree to which the strict pleading standard
decreases the probability of recovery and the degree to which it
decreases the value of filing the qui tam suit. In other words, most
of the value of the suit that is created or destroyed by changes to
the probability of recovery in the event of declination never enters
into counsel's calculations at the time he decides to accept the
relator's case.
This diluted relationship suggests that neither the strict nor
relaxed pleading standard will significantly affect a relator's
decision to blow the whistle. By filing a qui tam complaint under
seal, the relator immediately opens the door to a fishing trip that
requires neither particularity nor plausibility nor notice. Yet
rather than casting his own nets, he entrusts the fishing to a third
party, and a master angler indeed: the DOJ. The DOJ's ability to
subject an FCA target to years of unbridled preintervention
discovery, unencumbered by the bounds of permissible discovery
practice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the
relator to hitch his rowboat to a proverbial Pequod.218

216 This assumption is not grounded in the FOIA data but merely serves as an
illustration. The findings of the cross circuit data presented in Part III.A show that a strict
standard does not necessarily decrease the likelihood that a declined suit will obtain a
recovery at all.
217 That is, the difference of $3,100 represents a total value of 1.2 percent of the suit's
total expected value of $264,085.
218 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick; or, the Whale 69 (Norton 1976) ("A cannibal of a
craft, tricking herself forth in the chased bones of her enemies.").
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4. Relator behavior and efficient enforcement.
As illustrated by Equation 17, even larger-scale decreases to
the expected value of declination (VD) will not affect counsel's
filing decision when the expected value of intervention (Vi) is not
within a narrow margin above or below the pre-election costs (co).
And as illustrated by Equation 16, when the expected value of
intervention (Vi) does indeed approach a narrow range of the preelection costs (co), the expected value of declination (VD) will be
nonpositive and thus irrelevant. Changes to counsel's cost
structure do not affect this important finding. Even when preelection costs (co) greatly exceed postdeclination costs (CD), counsel
still benefits from filing, at the very least, a low-cost complaint.
Given that counsel's investment of resources is not a binary onoff switch, it is difficult to imagine any cost structure under which
even the strictest of pleading standards would deter the filing of
qui tam suits.
In many ways, the model's findings are intuitive. The
pleading standard for declined complaints hardly disturbs the
calculus that is already in place: counsel first and foremost seeks
intervention. The effect of a strict standard is not felt at the time
of filing but instead when intervention is declined and counsel
ponders the costs of continuing an uphill battle. At that stage, the
whistleblower has already done his job: he has brought his fraud
allegations to the attention of the DOJ.
The model suggests that the Solicitor General was incorrect
in his claim that the strict standard will "discourage the filing of

qui tam

suits."219

A relator with a high-merit suit will file

regardless of whether he believes he will be able to allege the
particulars of specific false claims. Given the extensive
framework for preintervention discovery in the form of CIDs and
the merits-signaling effect of government intervention, a strict
pleading standard will not discourage relators from bringing
fraud information to the attention of the DOJ and filing suit on
behalf of the government.
Moreover, recent scholarship has demonstrated that
increasing whistleblower rewards may counterintuitively impair
the DOJ's enforcement abilities.220 Increased bounties lead to an
overprovision of lower-quality whistleblower tips, which

219 Takeda Brief at *16 (cited in note 99).
220 See, for example, Casey and Niblett, 91 Wash U L Rev at 1185-89 (cited in
note 199).
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effectively swamp the DOJ's enforcement activities with a glut of
low-quality information.221 The steady increase in the average
investigation period of each qui tam complaint over the past
decades is likely attributable to the momentous increase in qui
tam filings.222 Like moderate and finely tuned bounty amounts, a
strict pleading standard for declined claims serves as a screening
mechanism. Although the strict pleading standard does not
decrease the filing rate as demonstrated above, a relaxed pleading
standard may cause an unwanted overprovision of qui tam
complaints. This is because although a decrease to the expected
value of declination (VD) will not decrease the frequency of highmerit qui tam complaints, an increase to VD adds directly to the
financial incentive to file in those cases in which VD is positive at
the time of filing. By increasing the value of suits in the
whistleblower-compensation model, the relaxed standard may
indirectly elicit an increased amount of lower-quality information
from whistleblowers, who may or may not have meritorious
claims. Although the DOJ is more receptive to carefully pleaded
complaints, it will not per se refuse to intervene in a qui tam
complaint that does not comply with Rule 9(b).223 This new influx
of information adds further pressure to the already resourceconstrained DOJ-which is required by the FCA to "diligently"
investigate every qui tam complaint224-and in turn impairs
efficient fraud enforcement.
The FOIA data set provides a preliminary view of such an
effect by comparing the raw number of qui tam filings before and
after the relaxed standard was adopted in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits.225

The following table provides a

circuit-specific

breakdown of qui tam filings during the two three-year periods of
2007-2009 and 2011-2013.226 For both tables, the filing tallies in

221 See id at 1175.

222 For an illustration of the momentous increase in filings since 1986, see Engstrom,
114 Colum L Rev at 1993 & fig 8 (cited in note 31).
223 See Brian D. Howe, Note, Conflicting Requirements of Notice: The Incorporation
of Rule 9(b) into the False Claims Act's First-to-FileBar, 113 Mich L Rev 559, 578 (2015)
("A pleading deficiency in a meritorious case should not and will not automatically
preclude the government from intervening in the action.").
224 31 USC § 3730(a). For an overview of the DOJ's resource constraints, see note 163.
225 For a similar examination of recovery rates before and after the relaxed standard
was implemented, see Part III.A.
226 The Kannegantidecision on April 8, 2009, likely did not have an immediate effect
on filings that were already being prepared by relator's counsel in 2009. Tables 5 and 6
utilize the 2007-2009 time period with the hope of capturing a trend that is more likely
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the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits during the two time
periods will serve as an experimental control or benchmark.
TABLE 5. CIRCUIT-SPECIFIC QuI TAM FILINGS BEFORE AND AFTER
KANNEGANTI AND EBEID

2d Cir
8th Cir
11th Cir
Strict Total
5th Cir
9th Cir
Relaxed Total

Pre-Kanneganti

Post-Kanneganti

and
Pre-Ebeid Filings
(2007-2009)

and
Post-Ebeid Filings
(2011-2013)

69
57
145
271
95
130
225

49
56
105
210
75
111
186

Change
-34.8%
-1.8%
-30.0%
-24.7%
-22.1%
-18.5%
-20.0%

Before analyzing these figures, it should be noted that unlike
the figures generated in Part III.A, these figures are based on
date of filing, and thus the 2011-2013 figures are right censored.
Although qui tam filings have been increasing steadily in recent
years, 227 the 2011-2013 column underreports the number of case
filings because the FOIA data set includes only those cases that
have been unsealed-that is, those cases in which an election
decision had been made by the time the FOIA data set was
provided in February 2015. However, this shortcoming in the data
is resolved by comparing the changes in filings across the circuits.
While the hard statistical value of these figures may be
limited, they function as anecdotal evidence to show that the
pleading standard may indeed have induced a larger number of
qui tam filings in the relaxed circuits than in the strict circuits.
The 4.7 percent difference observed between the changes in filing
rates in the relaxed circuits (-20.0 percent) and strict circuits
(-24.7 percent) may be indicative of larger trends that will be
observable only once a larger segment of the FCA litigation is
unsealed and analyzed using a later FOLA data set. To further
analyze the potential developments in relator activity, Table 6
presents the circuit-specific intervention rates for cases filed
during the same three-year time periods.

attributable to the changes in pleading standard, rather than other, unrelated changes in
the development of FCA litigation.
227 See DOJ, Fraud Statistics at *1-2 (cited in note 2).
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TABLE 6. CIRCUIT-SPECIFIC INTERVENTION RATES BEFORE AND
AFTER KANNEGANTI AND EBEID

2d Cir
8th Cir
11th Cir
Strict Total
5th Cir
9th Cir
Relaxed Total

Pre-Kanneganti and
Pre-Ebeid Intervention
Rate (2007-2009)
36.2%
15.8%
18.6%
22.5%
13.7%
18.5%
16.4%

Post-Kannegantiand
Post-EbeidIntervention
Rate (2011-2013)
24.4%
5.4%
14.6%
14.2%
6.8%
6.6%
6.7%

The results are startling. The intervention rates in the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits plummeted after the relaxed pleading
standard was adopted. While the right-censoring concerns
addressed in regard to Table 5 persist here,228 the figures still
suggest two mutually nonexclusive conclusions regarding relator
practices and the DOJ's investigative practices. First, it is
possible, as the model predicts, that the relaxed standard has
indeed incentivized a large number of lower-quality claims. In
this regard, the shockingly low intervention rates in the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits may indicate that the post-Kanneganti and postEbeid qui tam complaints in these circuits include an
overabundance of meritless claims.
Second, the low intervention rates in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits may also indicate that the United States Attorneys'
Offices in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have been overwhelmed by
a plethora of complaints that are not pleaded with sufficient
particularity to permit efficient and quick investigation. Beyond
the relaxed standard's effect on swamping the DOJ with lowquality information, this standard may also cause inefficient
shifts in counsel's behavior. Unlike the relaxed standard, the
strict standard incentivizes counsel to use the complaint and the
relator's disclosure statement for the primary purpose of helping
the government pinpoint the location of the false claims. Notably,
the DOJ itself expressed hesitation regarding exempting qui tam
complaints from Rule 9(b) altogether for this very reason. In 2008
the DOJ voiced strong opposition to a proposed FCA amendment
228 That is, because investigations of cases in which the DOJ ultimately intervenes
take longer, the intervention rate based on case filing year-asopposed to election yearresults in an overpopulation of declined cases and an underpopulation of intervened cases.
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that would relieve relators of the requirement of identifying
specific false claims at the pleading stage, because relator
complaints "that fail to allege fraud with adequate particularity
can waste the Government's investigative resources.229 Although
the relaxed pleading standard is not as drastic a relaxation as
eliminating Rule 9(b)'s application altogether, the same logic
applies: every marginal degree by which the pleading standard is
relaxed results in a marginal increase to the DOJ's expenditure
of investigative resources. To this extent, the low intervention
rates in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits may indicate that a far
larger percentage of qui tam complaints filed between 2011 and
2013 remain under investigation in these circuits than in the
Second and Eleventh Circuits. Not only does this result in
inefficient fraud enforcement, but also it costs taxpayers millions
as it permits the fraudulent practices to continue during the
government's delayed investigation.
Beyond its use as an interpretive tool for the Rule 9(b) circuit
split, the model presents broader implications for FCA reform in
general. Because postdeclination litigation plays a comparatively
diminished role in counsel's decision to file a suit-and in some
cases even has a negative expected value-advocates for FCA
reform must seek judicial and legislative adjustments elsewhere
in the litigation timeline.230 That is, none of the levers on the
declination side of litigation appears to have any desirable
influence on the predeclination behavior of relators. The cross
circuit FOIA data presented in Part III.A support this finding.
Given how few declined cases have actually succeeded-even in
circuits with the most liberal applications of Rule 9(b)-it is

229 See Nelson, Letter to the Honorable John Conyers Jr at *12 (cited in note 124).
See also US Department of Justice, FY 2016 Budget Request *4, archived at
http://perma.cc/JM7G-9MET (seeking a $1 million budget increase to handle "the
increasing number of whistleblower cases").
230 See, for example, False Claims Act CorrectionAct of 2009, HR Rep No 111-97,
11 1th Cong, 1st Sess 17 (2009). The Act sought to codify the relaxed pleading standard by
amending 31 USC § 3731 with the following language:

In pleading an action brought under section 3730(b), a person shall not be
required to identify specific claims that result from an alleged course of
misconduct if the facts alleged in the complaint, if ultimately proven true, would
provide a reasonable indication that one or more violations of section 3729 are
likely to have occurred, and if the allegations in the pleading provide adequate
notice of the specific nature of the alleged misconduct to permit the Government
effectively to investigate and defendants fairly to defend the allegations made.
Id at 17.
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surprising how much attention the pleading standard has
received from courts and scholars.
CONCLUSION

In some respects, one might consider the pleading standard
emblematic of the False Claims Act's search for the "golden mean"
between enforcement and efficiency.231 In this light, the pleading
standard is but one cog in a far-larger mechanical scale,
"balanc[ing] the need to encourage qui tam actions against the
need to prevent parasitic suits."232 Yet this Comment shows that
in other important respects the pleading puzzle is little more than
a procedural red herring. Judges seesaw in the application of
their circuits' respective iterations of the standard, closing and
opening the gateway to discovery depending on poorly defined
niceties of a case's factual constellation. Notwithstanding judicial
pronouncements of finely tuned pleading standards, the data set
shows what little effect the varying standards have had on case
outcomes across the circuits.
This Comment contributes to existing scholarship by
proposing new macrolevel lines of analysis and questioning the
degree of information asymmetry in declined cases. While each
individual qui tam complaint should not be lambasted as
meritless if it fails to meet the strict standard, courts should
recognize the larger costs of allowing such complaints to proceed
to discovery. The threats of socially suboptimal fraud
enforcement, warped actor incentives and gamesmanship, and
systemic agency inefficiency should make courts think twice
before tossing the strict pleading standard of Rule 9(b) into the
wastebasket of procedural history.

231 Graham County Soil and Water ConservationDistrict v United States, 559 US 280,
294 (2010).
232 United States v Ortho Biotech Products, LP, 579 F3d 13, 27 (1st Cir 2009), citing
United States v Becton Dickinson & Co, 21 F3d 1339, 1354-55 (4th Cir 1994).

